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DYNAMIC ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF SELECTED
PROVISIONS OF CORPORATE LAW:
THE ABSOLUTE DELEGATION RULE, DISCLOSURE OF
INTERMEDIATE ESTIMATES AND IPO PRICING
Royce de R. Barondes*
I. INTRODUCTION
The understanding of legal rules relating to transactions in commer-
cial settings has increasingly reflected the application of economic
principles. In its most basic form, one approach to analyzing the law
of contracts is that the set of default terms implied in contracts should
be those terms that would be reached in the absence of transaction
costs.' Although economic analyses have become increasingly quanti-
tative,2 they traditionally have been static; they have not purported to
* Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the States of New Hampshire
and New York. LD., University of Virginia School of Law, 1985; S.B. and S.M. (Mechanical Engi-
neering), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982.
I was introduced to the concept of applying dynamic principles to legal relationships by Peter
Huber, who was then a Professor at M.I.T. At his direction, in 1981 I investigated the feasibility of
regulating workplace safety through the imposition of a tax on workplace injuries by considering
dynamic concepts. Without that introduction, this Article would not have been possible. I also would
like to acknowledge the encouragement offered by Professors Ed Kitch and Saul Levmore. However,
the foregoing is not intended to impute to other persons concurrence with any portion of this Article
that may prove to be controversial.
1. E.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA.
L. REv. 945, 947 n.6 (1991) ('The managers' role in trying to make the firm's stock behave as if it
were trading in an efficient capital market corresponds to the role of transactional lawyers in trying to
approximate a world without transaction costs"); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal
Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. C-r. L. REV. 611, 623 n.18 (1985) ("When [contracting] costs
are high, the legal system should select the rule closest to this joint-maximization outcome."); Robert
M. Daines & Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate
Law, 102 YALE LJ. 577, 582 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANiEL R. FiscHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
2. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 627 (quantifying the impact of material misstate-
ments); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L.
REv. 277, 291-95 (1990) (analyzing the importance of distinguishing between systematic and unsys-
tematic risk in management's strategic decision-making).
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model varying short-term responses.
Understanding time-dependent responses can be important in ana-
lyzing economic systems. For an extreme example, consider a stock
market in which (i) individuals may purchase stock on margin by
paying only ten percent of the purchase price in cash and (ii) there are
two companies, one whose stock is predominantly owned by individu-
als who purchase on margin and the other with no such stockholders.'
An equal decrease in the equilibrium value of the two companies will
have different effects on the stock prices of the two firms. The de-
crease in value of the stock purchased on margin will cause some
stockholders to sell in order to meet margin calls. Those sales will
decrease the price at which the stock trades, and the stock price will
cascade downward, even if the stock prices of the two firms ultimately
reach identical equilibria. Any accurate analysis of the legal structure
that permitted such margin purchases would have to consider these
dynamic effects.
Recently, application of game theory has provided some time-de-
pendent analyses. Articles applying game theory may create decision
matrices, analyzing outcomes for various parties assuming implemen-
tation of various strategies, or decision trees, permitting analyses of
problems modeled as multiple, discrete decisions.4 However, models
constructed from analyzing discrete decisions may be impractical for
investigating problems involving numerous decision-makers who con-
tinually interact.
One set of economic relationships involving numerous actors who
exhibit curious actions are manifested in the prices at which securities
trade. Securities prices exhibit oscillatory movements, which have
been characterized as resulting from fads or herd instincts.5 Some
legal commentators have raised the possibility that chaos theory might
provide insights concerning trading markets, but many of those com-
mentators have failed to apply the theory to relevant legal rules to
arrive at useful conclusions.6 Alternative intellectual frameworks may
3. See infra note 62 for a similar example.
4. Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 388
(1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to
Corporate Law, 60 U. CIR. L. REv. 347 (1991). See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Stampeding Share-
holders and Other Myths: Target Shareholders and Hostile Tender Offers, 15 J. CORP. L. 417, 421-
24 (1990); Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 750 (1992); Ian
Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1291, 1298-1307 (1990) (reviewing ERIC
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1989)).
5. See infra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory:
[Vol. 7:97
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explain effects observed in this and other contexts and assist in the
specification of rational regulations.
For example, the market for a particular security might be viewed
as a dynamic system. The price of the security varies over time in
response to numerous factors, such as announcements by the
security's issuer of new business developments. In addition, the his-
torical trading prices of the security may affect future trading prices.
For example, if the price falls dramatically in response to a particular
development, that decline may engender panic and create a further fall
in price in response, or an "overreaction," to further sales. When the
panic dissipates, the market price may partially rebound. This example
highlights the distinction between a static economic analysis, which
would predict the ultimate price, and a dynamic model that would
permit analysis of the possibility of an overreaction. In some contexts,
these overreactions may be significant. Where overreactions are signif-
icant, an analysis of the governing regulatory framework may benefit
from consideration of these dynamic concepts, as the regulatory
framework may exacerbate the overreactions.7 An analysis of such a
relationship that included separating the market reaction into discrete
steps might not be feasible.
This Article examines three separate aspects of the relationships
between corporations and their securityholders from a dynamic eco-
nomic perspective: (i) the feasibility of permitting shareholders to
participate in the management of their corporations through the exer-
cise of voting rights, (ii) Rule 3b-6, the safe harbor for projections
(the Safe Harbor)' under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
1934 Act),9 and (iii) the extraordinary returns available from investing
in initial public offerings (IPO's). Three particular dynamic aspects are
implicated in these situations. The first aspect is that reasonable, pre-
dictable behavior of a group of actors requires that the group responds
Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 158-60
(1991); Andrew R. Simmonds et al., Dealing with Anomalies, Confusion and Contradiction in Fraud
on the Market Securities Class Actions, 81 KY. LJ. 123, 145-46 (1992). But see infra note 79.
7. The application of dynamic concepts to analyses of economic relationships is not unique to
this Article. See, e.g., KATrsumKO OGATA, MODERN CONTROL ENGINEERING 3 (2d ed. 1990).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1994). There are substantially identical provisions under other federal
securities laws. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1993); 17 C.F.R. §§ 250.103A, 260.0-11 (1994). As used in
this Article, the term "Safe Harbor" includes those provisions. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)
(1993). The SEC recently issued a major concept release seeking comment on various aspects of the
Safe Harbor. Concept Release, Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release
No. 7101, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,723 (1994) [hereinafter Concept Release].
9. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a-7811 (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1993).
1994]
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and reaches a new equilibrium in a period of time significantly shorter
than the time over which changes in the environment occur. The sec-
ond aspect is that feedback, which is defined as a mechanism in which
the response of a group of actors to any particular change has the
effect of producing a secondary input to which the group of actors
responds,"0 may cause a system to be better behaved. These insights
are applied to consider the extent to which voting by shareholders
could feasibly govern a corporation. Typically, corporations do not
permit shareholders generally to vote on matters concerning the
corporations' management; the power to decide most matters is re-
tained exclusively by their boards of directors and officers. One com-
mentator applying game theory has concluded that this absolute dele-
gation is an attempt to avoid cyclical voting patterns in which alter-
native, inconsistent plans would be adopted by shareholders." Part II
-of this Article analyzes whether the mechanisms by which sharehold-
ers propose and vote on resolutions have created a dynamic relation-
ship that would produce this result.
The third dynamic aspect applied in this Article is that smoother,
less abrupt changes with which a group is presented may produce less
erratic responses by the group. This insight is applied to consider the
effects of the Safe Harbor. The Safe Harbor encourages only disclo-
sure by reporting companies" of projections of financial statement
items, to the exclusion of "intermediate" estimates and opinions, Le.,
estimates and opinions that relate only to small portions of a
company's business or to particular products. 3 Part In of this Article
analyzes whether that limitation in the Safe Harbor may make trading
prices of securities more volatile. Part IV of this Article identifies
certain aspects of the regulation of IPO's that may exacerbate the
10. See J. LowEN SHEARER Er AL., INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEM DYNAMICS 333 (1967).
11. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying texL
12. The phrase "reporting company" refers to a company required to file with the SEC periodic
reports pursuant Section 13 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1993),
by virtue of having a class of securities registered under Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C.S. §§ 781(b) and 781(g) (Law. Co-op. 1983), or by virtue of Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78o(d) (Law. Co-op. 1983), as a result of having sold securities in a registered offering.
Section 12(b) provides for registration under the 1934 Act of a class of securities registered on a
national securities exchange, whereas Section 12(g) relates to equity securities held of record by 500
or more persons issued by companies with more than $1 million in total assets. The SEC has exempt-
ed from the registration requirements of Section 12(g) companies with total assets not exceeding
$5 million (as long as, in the case of a non-U.S. private issuer, the securities also are not quoted on
an inter-dealer quotation system). 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1994).
13. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7:97
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volatility of stock prices immediately following an IPO.
This Article attempts to apply a primarily qualitative analysis of
these issues (although that effort may not have been entirely suc-
cessful). Discussion of these concepts limited to considering the orders
of magnitude of the quantities involved is adequate for the purposes of
reaching practical conclusions concerning the applicable legal rules.
Although a quantitative analysis could provide more precision, a quali-
tative understanding of system dynamics in each of the cases provides
adequate insight to analyze the legal rules considered. t4
This introduction should not be interpreted as implying that
economists' analyses based on game theory have been limited to the
creation of discrete decision trees. Game theory also may analyze
games with an infinite number of subgames, i.e., separate decisions,15
may permit continuous strategies, 6 may incorporate discount rates in
considering sequential decisions, 7 as is used in Part II, and may be
significantly more rigorous, quantitative and sophisticated than the
analysis contained in this Article. 8 Perhaps as a reflection of a desire
to minimize mathematical complexity, many of these theoretical exten-
sions have not been fully reflected in legal journals. Economists con-
centrating in game theory might formulate an analysis similar to that
set forth in Part H, although they might use different terminology to
explain the concepts. However, the analysis in Part Ill, which con-
14. Certain economic studies of the issues discussed below are structured in the form of determin-
ing whether certain trading strategies would be profitable. See generally James M. Patell & Mark A.
Wolfson, The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to Earnings and Dividend Announce-
ments, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 231-36 (1984) (finding that implementation of a trading rule that bought
and held for 30 minutes stock of issuers that announced earnings exceeding the most recent forecast
contained in Value Line, and selling stock if the issuer reported earnings less than those contained in
that forecast, produced statistically significant returns even when commenced through the first 30
minutes of trading in the day following the date of the announcement); Robert Jennings & Laura
Starks, Information Content and the Speed of Stock Price Adjustment, 23 J. AcCr. RES. 336, 346-48
(1985) (noting that the level of extreme hourly price changes (Le., price changes within the extreme
5% tails of non-announcement period hourly price change frequency distribution) was elevated at
statistically significant levels for up to approximately eight hours following an earnings announce-
ment). A more quantitative analysis may be applied more profitably by market participants.
15. E.g., JAMES W. FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY wrrH APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMICS 124-38
(1990); ERIC RAsMusEr, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 91-99
(1989); Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting, 56
ECONOMETRICA 383 (1988); Royce de R. Barondes, An Economic Analysis of the Potential for Coer-
cion in Consent Solicitations for Bonds, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 749 (1994); Drew Fudenberg & Eric
Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54
ECONOMEmRICA 533 (1986).
16. E.g., RASMUSEN, supra note 15, at 69-78.
17. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 133-37; RASMUSEN, supra note 15, at 92-93, 231-35.
18. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 15; RASMUSEN, supra note 15.
19941
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siders feedback, is less traditional.
II. CYCLICAL VOTING PATTERNS
Corporate law generally provides that the ordinary business of a
corporation is to be managed by its board of directors and the officers
appointed by the board, to the exclusion of action by the sharehold-
ers. '9 These requirements are set forth in state corporation law stat-
utes' and are a long-standing part of corporate law.2 Certain juris-
dictions permit this provision to be changed with charter or other
provisions.' Such provisions generally have not been adopted by
19. Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corpo-
rate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 379, 388-89, 394, 456-57 (1994);
Gordon, supra note 4, at 348-49.
Forty-two states have recently adopted statutes permitting the formation of limited liability
companies. ROBERT R. KEATINGE ET AL., Limited Liability Companies: Into the Mainstream, ALI-
ABA VrDEO LAW REVIEW STubY, March 17, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Q229 ALI-ABA 1,
identifies thirty-six states that have adopted those statutes. Limited liability company statutes have
subsequently been adopted in Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 10.50 (Supp. 1994), California, CAL. CORP.
CODE § 17000 (West Supp. 1995), Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1994), Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 601 (West Supp. 1994), New York, N.Y. Lim-
riED LIAtILrrY COMPANY LAW § 101 (McKinney Supp. 1995), and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-201 (Supp. 1994). The members of these companies may retain the power to vote on the compan-
ies' management, although the companies may provide for management by managers. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp.
1994). The creation of limited liability companies in which members participate in the companies'
management may offer the opportunity to test Professor Gordon's analysis.
This part of this Article refers only to shareholders, as typically only common shareholders
have the right generally to vote on matters raised at meetings. However, this analysis is also applica-
ble to meetings at which holders of preferred stock can vote, as well as to meetings of corporations
that have outstanding "voting debt," which corporation law may permit. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §
204(a)(7) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1991). However, the senior status of those
securities might diminish the magnitude of the effects summarized below.
20. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990) ("Subject to the provisions of this division and
any limitations in the articles relating to action required to be approved by shareholders (Section 153)
or by the outstanding shares (Section 152), or by a less than majority vote of a class or series of pre-
ferred shares (Section 402.5), the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and all
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the direction of the board. The board may delegate
the management.., provided that the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and
all corporate powers shall be exercised under the ultimate direction of the board.").
21. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 349. The historical development of these provisions is detailed
in Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6-22
(1992).
22. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, ex-
cept as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 156B, §§ 47, 54 (West 1992) ("Except as reserved to the stockholders pursuant to
section fifty-four, [providing that powers may be conferred upon or reserved to the stockholders in
the articles or the by-laws,] the business of every corporation shall be managed by a board of direc-
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large public corporations.' However, the corporation law of some
jurisdictions provides that shareholders of close corporations may vote
on all such matters.'
These provisions have not given rise to a sufficient number of suits
to clarify their scope for purposes of state corporation law.' Howev-
er, each year, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the SEC) grants numerous no-action letters to reporting companies
that wish to exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy statements
on the basis that the proposals concern matters that, under state law,
have been delegated exclusively to the boards of directors.'
tors:'). The law in various jurisdictions is summarized in 2 MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr ANN. §
8.01 statutory comparison 1 (3d ed. Supp. 1986).
23. Gordon, supra note 4, at 349.
24. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 620(c), 701
(McKinney 1986) ("Subject to any provision in the certificate of incorporation authorized by para-
graph (b) of Section 620 (Agreements as to voting; provision in certificate of incorporation as to
control of directors) [of a corporation that has no shares listed on a national securities exchange or
regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market] or by paragraph (b) of Section 715 (Officers), the
business of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors... "). See
HAROLD J. MARSH, 1 MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW 404 (2d ed. 1984); Gordon, supra
note 4, at 349 n.8.
25. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877,
884 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
26. Rule 14a-8(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1994). Procedurally, these issues arise when a
shareholder wishes to change a corporation's policy and requests that the corporation include in its
annual proxy statement, and have the shareholders at the annual meeting vote on, a proposal that the
board adopt a specified policy. If the corporation intends to omit the proposal, it must deliver the
proposal to the SEC. 17 C.F.L § 240.14a-8(d). In response to the filing, the staff of the SEC states
objections or that it will not recommend enforcement proceedings against the corporation if the pro-
posal is omitted from the proxy statement. Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of
Staff Advice with Respect to Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,599, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,635, at 86,604 (July 7, 1976). See also Alan R.
Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV.
879, 881 n.7 (1994) (discussing the mechanics by which a corporation may omit shareholder propos-
als).
The bases on which a proposal may be omitted are set forth in Rule 14a-8(c), and include,
among others, that the proposal concerns a matter on which the shareholders may not vote under
state law, that the proposal addresses a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business opera-
tions of the reporting company and that the proposal is misleading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1), (3)
and (7). A note to sub-paragraph (c)(1) of this rule states:
Whether a proposal is a proper subject for action by security holders will depend on
the applicable state law. Under certain states' laws, a proposal that mandates certain action
by the registrant's board of directors may not be a proper subject matter for shareholder
action, while a proposal recommending or requesting such action of the board may be
proper under such state laws.
Although such a precatory resolution would not be binding on the corporation if it were adopted,
Gordon, supra note 4, at 349 n.7, its approval might nevertheless induce the board to comply with its
spirit. See Trans World Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1311, 1318, 1322 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(stating, with respect to a precatory proposal that a reporting company spin off or sell its subsidiaries,
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A. Theoretical Basis for the Prediction of Cycling
Two justifications typically have been attributed to this "absolute
delegation" rule: (i) that the delegation is efficient and therefore in-
creases shareholder wealth or (ii) that it represents a "power grab" by
management, which can impose this rule because it can choose the
corporation's jurisdiction of incorporation.27 In an interesting article,
Professor Jeffrey Gordon has proposed an alternative basis for the
rule-that the chances of "cycling," in which each approved option is
in turn defeated by another option preferred by a different coalition of
shareholders, are very great in a corporation, and the absolute delega-
tion rule prevents cycling.2" Alternative terminology sometimes used
in the legal literature is that the preferences of shareholders may not
be "transitive."29 Professor Gordon's analysis is related to the observa-
tion that if one has the ability to select the agenda of a meeting of a
group with diverse interests (i.e., the power to determine those choices
presented to the group), by structuring the available choices, the indi-
vidual setting the agenda may be able to determine the outcome."
The theoretical basis for this conclusion may be briefly summa-
rized.31 A corporation's management may consider numerous, con-
"[lit is reasonable to assume ... that a showing of substantial shareholder support for [a defendant's]
resolution might well-and indeed properly should--exert substantial influence on management poli-
cies."). See generally Goforth, supra note 19, at 418 (discussing precatory proposals); Palmiter, su-
pra, at 890-91 (discussing precatory proposals).
27. Gordon, supra note 4, at 353-58.
28. Id. at 359-61. Professor Gordon also argues that the rule is designed to prevent improper
agreements among management and shareholders that would result in benefits not shared by all
shareholders. Id. at 375-78.
29. If the preferences are transitive, then A>B and B>C imply that A>C. See DUNCAN BLACK,
THE THEORY OF COMMITEES AND ELECTIONS 19 (1958); AMARTYA SEN, COLLECrIVE CHOICE AND
SOCIAL WELFARE 2, 8 (1970). Intransitivity may be more familiar to sports enthusiasts, who may
often be puzzled, and annoyed, when their favorite team loses a match with a rival team even though
the rival had previously lost to a third team that the favorite team had previously defeated.
A more rigorous analysis of this voting paradox would note that although transitivity prevents
cycling, it is not a necessary condition. For example, if there are four choices and x>xv x2>x and
x3>x but x4 and x, are equally weighted, cycling may not occur. SEN, supra, at 47-49.
30. Gordon, supra note 4, at 360. Professor Gordon notes that the ability to control the outcome
is dependent on shareholders exercising their vote consistent with their true preferences in the choices
that are presented to them, i.e., individuals who recognize that they are being manipulated and do not
vote in accordance with their true preferences can circumvent the power of the individual setting the
agenda. *Id. at 360 n.32.
31. More detailed analyses of this voting paradox are included in BLACK, supra note 29; DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-55
(1991); SEN, supra note 29; and Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and
the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REv. 971, 986-96 (1989).
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flicting strategies that may be adopted to maximize the return to its
shareholders. If the various possibilities were evaluated by fully in-
formed shareholders, the shareholders would rank the possibilities
differently, based on their own assessments of the returns from the
strategies and their own preferences with respect to risk as well as
their investment horizons.32 If shareholders were presented the oppor-
tunity to determine the strategy to be followed by voting on the strate-
gies on a pairwise basis, the votes would not necessarily be rational
(i.e., transitive).
For example, if three strategies are considered, to which we assign
names A, B and C, strategy A might be preferred in a vote in which
strategies A and B were presented, and strategy B might be preferred
in a vote in which strategies B and C were considered, but strategy C
might prevail in a shareholder vote considering strategies A and C. An
example of a corporation that would result in this voting pattern is
represented by Table 1, which assumes that there are three types of
shareholders. The types of shareholders are distinguished by their
ranking of the three strategies. Within each shareholder type, each
group of shareholders is assumed to have a demand curve for the
corporation's stock similar to that for the stock as a whole. Thus, the
numbers set forth in Table 1 represent the valuations of the marginal
shareholders of each type of shareholder. Each type of shareholder
also is assumed to be equally represented among the shareholders.33
32. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 368-70.
33. Table 1 is suggested by a table in Gordon, supra note 4, at 362, which presents these choices
without quantifying the value to each shareholder.
1994]
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TABLE 1




A $ 9.00 $10.75 $10.00
B $11.00 $10.00 $9.75
C 1 $10.00 1 $ 9.25 1 $10.25
This Table should not be construed as implying that cycling always
will occur. Some decisions may be irreversible if they are promptly
implemented, such as a decision to sell all assets to various third
parties. Also, there may be one choice that is preferred by a majority
in a pairwise comparison with each other alternative. Such a choice is
referred to as a "Condorcet" choice.' In addition, a group will not
engage in cycling if the members have "single peaked preferences."35
A group's members' preferences are "single peaked" with respect to a
decision among various options if it is possible to order the options in
a manner that meets the following criterion: for each member, pro-
ceeding from that member's most preferred option toward both ends
of the ordered list, that member prefers each option to the next suc-
ceeding option.36 The discussion in this Article therefore should not
34. BLACK, supra note 29, at 57; Levmore, supra note 31, at 994. Professor Levmore discusses a
voting mechanism in which a Condorcet choice may be defeated in id. at 1018 n.133. See generally
BLACK, supra note 29, at 57-59.
35. BLACK, supra note 29, at 19; FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 31, at 48; Levmore, supra note
31, at 987.
36. See BLACK, supra note 29, at 7; Levmore, supra note 31, at 987 n.47. This condition is more
restrictive than is required. Cycling will not occur if every set of three choices can be arranged in a
single-peaked manner. SEN, supra note 29, at 167-68.
If the assumption that the members' preferences are single peaked is relaxed to permit the
members to be indifferent among their preferred choices, which is referred to as having preferences
that are single peaked with a plateau, the members' preferences will remain transitive. BLACK, supra
note 29, at 31. The scope of this Article is limited to identifying dynamic aspects that may provide
useful insights into some issues. An excellent, interesting discussion of certain literature concerning
social choice with greater detail is contained in Levmore, supra note 31, at 984-90.
There has been some effort to quantify the likelihood that out of a set of choices, no choice
would have a majority over every other choice. Assuming that all orderings are equally likely for
each individual and that there is a very large number of individuals, the probability that there would
be no majority winner is .09 for three choices and .49 for 10 choices. SEN, supra note 29, at 163-64.
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be regarded as addressing the sole circumstance under which cycling
would not occur.
B. Effect of Changing Share Holdings on Stability
One of the assumptions underlying the conclusion that cycling will
occur in corporations that are not governed by the absolute delegation
rule is that the composition of the shareholders will remain constant
between votes. By considering the effect that any particular vote on a
shareholder proposal would have on the outcome of subsequent share-
holder proposals, one can reassess the likelihood that cycling would
occur.
In the example set forth above, if each shareholder estimates that
the corporation is equally likely to adopt any one of the three strate-
gies, the expected value that each marginal shareholder ascribes to the
corporation's equity is $10. Assume that the alternative strategies had
been presented to the shareholders at an annual meeting. Notwith-
standing the voting paradox, one of the strategies would have been
approved at the annual meeting. Whether the rules of the meeting
permitted only one strategy to be considered at that meeting or the
meeting sequentially considered .multiple strategies, the results of some
vote would have been controlling. That event would have had an
impact on each shareholder's valuation of the corporation's stock.
To approximate the impact of the approval of any strategy, assume
that (i) each strategy, if implemented, would generate earnings in each
year equal to the market discount rate times the value of the
corporation's equity, (ii) there are no costs incurred in changing strate-
gies, (iii) the shareholders could not revisit their decision until the
next annual meeting, and (iv) the resolution at the first meeting did
not change the shareholders' estimate of the probability that any strat-
egy would be adopted at the next meeting. Immediately following the
annual meeting, the shareholders' valuation of the equity would vary
by an amount equal to the difference between their valuation of the
strategy selected and the original value, multiplied by the quotient
obtained by dividing the annual market rate of return by one plus the
annual market rate of return.37 The shareholders who assigned the
The assumption may be significantly conservative. It is curious that these quantitative estimates of
the likelihood that there would be no majority winner have not received more mention in legal litera-
ture.
37. If a corporation's postponement by T years of its adoption of a particular business plan with a
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highest value to the adopted strategy would have had their valuation
of the corporation's equity increased, and those who assigned the
lowest value to the adopted strategy would have had their valuation of
the corporation's equity decreased.
The dollar amounts of these changes in valuation may seem insuffi-
cient to affect materially the shareholders' composition. In part, the
assumptions probably substantially understate the quantitative effect of
the approval of a particular strategy. In particular, the assumption of
constant shareholders' assessments of the likely outcome has eliminat-
ed a substantial part of the effect. This assumption is used to create a
conservative model, as quantifying those estimates would be complex.
This analysis also has neglected any costs to reverse one strategy and
implement an alternative and assumed that new strategies could be
implemented without delay."8
present value of V merely postpones the corporation's receipt of each anticipated future benefit, and
does not change their amount, the decreased present value of adoption of the plan will equal
V(l+r), where r is the discount rate. This familiar result can be derived arithmetically.
If V=-E p '
11 (I+r"
where P, is the benefit received in the i' period and t, is the number of years from the present until




M (+r) r (1ar)'"
= 1 Pa
V=(I +r)T
Thus, the change in the value that a shareholder would ascribe to a corporation after a vote at
an annual meeting, given the specified assumptions, would be:
(V.V)r + 0- V
1+r 1'+r
where AV is the value that the shareholder ascribes to the approved option minus V, the original
value. After simplification, the change is given by [r/(1+r)]AV.
38. In concluding that shareholders will not follow management's recommendations concerning
shareholder proposals if shareholders could participate in corporate management, Professor Gordon
states that shareholders "would also know that if they succeeded with a shareholder initiative, it
would increase the likelihood that their preferred alternative prevailed. This is because the next possi-
ble shareholder proponent may calculate that she loses more from a possible cycle than her own
initiative." Gordon, supra note 4, at 364. This language does not articulate the basis on which the
second proposal will be withdrawn, but may refer to costs associated with reversing a decision.
Whether this reference is to costs to reverse a decision or to other factors, any such factor increases
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The nature of the securities markets suggests that even small dis-
parities in stock valuations may have a significant effect on the profile
of a corporation's shareholders. A seminal article written in 1972
analyzed the prices of securities sold in secondary offerings and con-
sidered two competing theories: the price-pressure hypothesis, in
which secondary sales are expected to require a discount to entice
purchases by marginal purchasers, and the substitution hypothesis, in
which the existence of close substitutes is expected to result in an
essentially horizontal demand curve.39 Based on empirical evidence,
the author estimated the marginal elasticity of demand to be on the
order of -3000,4 and concluded, "Since securities provide similar po-
tential consumption streams, they are close substitutes."4 There is
some disagreement among economists whether the demand curves for
stock are essentially horizontal.4 2 However, the inherent stability of
this voting mechanism requires only that there are close substitutes for
stocks-a less demanding assumption. If the elasticity of demand for a
stock were -1000, or even -100, relatively small changes arising from
the adoption of any strategy would have a substantial effect on the
composition of the shareholders.
The process described above would not prevent cycling where there
are small differences in the values that shareholders attribute to the
various alternatives. However, that result is not unique to group deci-
the likelihood that sequential meetings will approve the same proposal, ie., that cycling will not
occur.
39. Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the
Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972).
40. Id. at 195.
41. Id. at 206.
42. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 308 (4th ed. 1991); Laurie S. Bagwell, Shareholder Heterogeneity: Evidence and Implica-
tions, AM. ECON. REV., May 1991, at 218, 221 [hereinafter Bagwell, Evidence and Implications]
("Preliminary findings indicate that supply curves [experienced in Dutch auction repurchases] are
more elastic when institutional holdings are high, dividend yield is high, price has not varied much in
the past 5 years, and the fraction bought back is large."); Laurie S. Bagwell, Dutch Auction Repur-
chases: An Analysis of Shareholder Heterogeneity, 47 L FIN. 71, 77 (1992) (finding an average elas-
ticity of supply of 1.65 in issuers' stock repurchases in Dutch auctions); Bradford, supra note 4, at
438 n.138 ('The general conclusion of this work is that demand is highly elastic.... [S]ince the
buyers and sellers are the same people, elastic demand does imply elastic supply."); Lloyd R. Cohen,
Why Tender Offers? The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Supply of Stock, and Signaling, 19 J. LE-
OA STUD. 113, 131-32 (1990); Hazen, supra note 6, at 148 n.38; Saul Levmore, Efficient Markets
and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645, 653 (1984); Claudio Loderer et al., The Price
Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock, 46 J. FIN. 621, 640 (1991) (finding an average elasticity of
demand of -11.12); Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579,
588-89 (1986).
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sion-making. Any decision-maker may vacillate when presented with
competing strategies that have essentially equal values, although the
valuations that are essentially equal for this purpose may be different
for a decision-maker consisting of a group of shareholders.43
This process manifests a response that is an important part of ensur-
ing stability; once an equilibrium is reached, the participants adjust in
a fashion that makes subsequent deviations from the equilibrium less
likely." A second aspect of the system that must be considered is
whether the participants adjust quickly relative to the time between
changes in the external forces. If the participants are subjected to
changing circumstances that vary rapidly relative to the time that the
participants require to respond, the actions of the participants will be
unpredictable. Because unambiguous information is incorporated into
the trading market for securities very quickly, i.e., within a few
days,45 this requirement is satisfied.
C. Limits on the Stability
Certain circumstances in which the above discussion may not be
accurate merit identification. This analysis has assumed that the mar-
ket price of a stock and individuals' desire to purchase or sell stock is
based exclusively on the return of the stock, i.e., the value of its divi-
dends, any amounts received on liquidation and any amounts received
on resale.' However, to the extent that shareholders are asked to
43. The effect of the alteration of members' preference schedules on the choice of a group is
discussed in BLACK, supra note 29, at 109-19. The author notes that when the preference curves are
not single-peaked, the theory "becomes involved... and would be too difficult to pursue further
.. " Id  at 118.
44. A related factor also will militate against cycling. Table 1 differs from the matrix included in
Gordon, supra note 4, as dollar values are assigned to the various strategies. This difference high-
lights an important point in considering the chances that cycling will occur. Investors seeking finan-
cial returns invariably attribute a dollar value to securities, i.e., they are indifferent to either possess-
ing the security or the specified dollar amount. Any voting outcome that does not result in the high-
est aggregate valuation by all shareholders (in Table 1, any outcome other than adoption of strategy
B) is inherently unstable. See generally SEN, supra note 29, at 89-130 (analyzing the importance of
members assigning comparable numerical values to various choices).
45. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
46. For this purpose, it is not relevant whether a security's price accurately reflects in some ob-
jective way the value of the payment stream to be received from owning and disposing of the securi-
ty, referred to by some commentators as "fundamental efficiency." See infra note 86 and accompany-
ing text. For example, this analysis would be applicable if securities traded at a multiple of the ex-
pected value of those payment streams or at that amount plus some constant. Rather, it is only re-
quired that there be a significant negative relationship between the price at which persons will pur-
chase a security and the amount of time that a company postpones implementing a new business
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vote on proposals that would not materially affect the payment stream
to be received from holding and disposing of stock (because the share-
holder proposals are immaterial47 or reflect non-financial, e.g., moral,
judgments), the analysis set forth above will not apply, and cyclic
voting patterns would not be prevented. Shareholders often present
proposals concerning this type of matter to corporations for inclusion
in their annual proxy statements.48 Even if the reason underlying
venture that is anticipated to generate increased payment streams. More formally, the partial deriva-
tive of the value of the security with respect to the time such a proposal is delayed must be signifi-
cant and negative.
47. The federal securities laws have a materiality limit on the extent, to which corporations are
required to include shareholder proposals. Rule 14a-8(c)(5) provides that corporations need not in-
clude in proxy statements proposals that relate to operations accounting for less than 5% of the
registrant's total assets, gross sales and net earnings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1994). This restric-
tion probably is too limited to prevent cycling.
48. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to review the SEC's affirmance of the Division
of Corporation of Finance's statement that the Division would not recommend an enforcement action
if a reporting company excluded from its proxy statement a shareholder proposal requesting the es-
tablishment of a committee to study the impact on the company of various health care reform propos-
als); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877,
890-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding (i) that a proposal requiring disclosure of Wal-Mart's equal employ-
ment and affirmative action policies could not be omitted and (ii) that the SEC's issuance of a no-ac-
tion letter inconsistent with a prior interpretative release and prior no-action letters was not entitled to
deference); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. International Paper Co., 801 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (considering a shareholder.proposal to implement the Valdez principles on environmental re-
sponsibility); GenCorp Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,622 (Dec. 15, 1992) (considering a proposal that the board provide a comprehensive report on
the company's involvement in the Strategic Defense Initiative); Cracker Barrel Old Country Store,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,418, at
77,287 (Oct. 13, 1992) (concerning a shareholder proposal requesting that a nondiscriminatory em-
ployment policy related to sexual orientation be adopted, in which the Staff stated, "Mhe Division
has determined that the fact that a shareholder proposal concerning a company's employment policies
and practices for the general workforce is tied to a social issue will no longer be viewed as removing
the proposal from the realm of ordinary business operations of the registrant."), overruled by New
York Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Philip Morris Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,474 (Feb. 22, 1990)
(considering a proposal that the board take steps necessary to cause the company not to conduct any
business in tobacco or tobacco products); Standard Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter, [1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,354 (Feb. 12, 1980) (considering a proposal request-
ing that the board establish a policy of not selling products or providing services to the South African
police or military); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,148 (Mar. 21, 1977) (concerning a proposal that the board adopt a
corporate policy of not allowing its advertisements to appear in television programs containing exces-
sive violence). See generally Dallas, supra note 21, at 14 n.55; Palmiter, supra note 26, at 900-03,
905-10 (discussing the history of these proposals and recounting that the SEC has been inconsistent
in diciding whether shareholder proposals properly may be excluded); Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott
J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. I.J. 635, 642-48 (1977).
Certain jurisdictions permit directors to consider non-shareholder interests in considering the
best interests of a corporation. Those statutes are analyzed in exhaustive detail in Eric W. Orts, Be-
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shareholders' desire for a corporation to adopt a particular policy is
not based on increasing the payment stream to be derived from own-
ing stock, if implementation of the policy would incur material costs
and a revocation of that policy would require additional costs, cyclic
voting patterns would not develop as long as the value of the payment
stream derived from owning stock was one of the material factors
considered by shareholders in placing a value on stock. However, the
risk that cycling would occur with respect to proposals raising social
issues supports excluding shareholder proposals that raise those social
issues.
The above discussion also has assumed that shareholder proposals
would be considered at successive annual meetings, and the forces that
make cycling unlikely are dependent on a material amount of time
passing between votes. Many jurisdictions grant shareholders owning a
specified percentage of outstanding voting securities the power to
require that a special meeting be held.49 Other jurisdictions permit
governing corporate documents to grant shareholders this power.5"
This power, where granted, presents less of an opportunity for share-
holders to call special meetings in quick succession than may be ap-
parent.
Shareholders desiring to include a shareholder proposal in a report-
ing company's proxy statement are required to deliver the proposal to
the company not less than 120 days before the day the annual meeting
was held in the preceding year."' A board of directors should be able
to exercise its discretion not to schedule during that period a special
meeting requested by the shareholders. 2 Thus, even where extremely
yond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992).
See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 971 (1992). Those statutes are not directly implicated by the analysis of this Article, as they
regulate the factors considered by directors (and not those that are considered by shareholders, who
are assumed to vote in accordance with their own interests).
49. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(d) (West 1991). The percentages of votes required to call a
special meeting in various jurisdictions are collected in 2 MODEL BusmNESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.02
statutory comparison 2 (3d ed. Supp. 1986).
50. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (1991).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(3) (1994).
52. See 2 MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr ANN. § 7.02 cmt. 2 (3d ed. Supp. 1986) ("The respon-
sible corporate officers have some discretion as to the call and purposes of a meeting, and where
demands are repetitious or overlapping, they may refuse to call a meeting for a purpose identical or
similar to a purpose for which a previous special meeting was held in the recent past. Similarly, they
may decline to call a special meeting when an annual meeting will be held in the near future."). Cf.
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding that, under the business
judgment rule, management may postpone an annual meeting when a tender offer was made, since
[Vol. 7:97
HeinOnline  -- 7 DePaul Bus. L.J. 112 1994-1995
DYNAMIC ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
motivated shareholders desire to revisit any shareholder vote by call-
ing a special meeting, there would be substantial periods of time in
which meetings would not be held.
Some jurisdictions permit shareholders owning shares representing a
majority of the voting power of all outstanding shares to take action
by written consent in lieu of a meeting, unless the corporation's certif-
icate of incorporation provides otherwise. 3 This power presents op-
portunities for cycling, not only because there are fewer inherent lim-
its on the timing of such actions but also because there is no structure
to the agenda where action is being taken by shareholder consent. If
shareholders could participate in a corporation's management through
written consents, numerous inconsistent shareholder consents could be
simultaneously circulated.
This provision of corporate law does not explain the absolute dele-
gation rule. Public corporations already restrict or eliminate action by
majority shareholder consent as a typical part of plans to prevent a
hostile acquisition,' and those corporations could permit shareholders
to vote on ordinary business matters at annual meetings without creat-
ing the chaos that would result from continual circulation of numer-
ous, conflicting consents. Because other states require that action by
written consent of shareholders be unanimous,55 the absolute delega-
tion rule cannot be explained by the state law provisions granting the
power to act by written consent.
Corporations that have few shareholders and that are not widely
followed by analysts might not benefit from this stability, because
there would be a diminished turnover of shareholders. Those corpora-
tions, whose operations are between the traditional frameworks of
close corporations and publicly held corporations, cannot be easily
analyzed, and may not act predictably, because traditional assumptions
about corporate governance will not be applicable.
The essence of this discussion is that time lags between sequential
shareholder votes on incompatible strategies substantially decreases
deferral did not "threaten the legitimacy of the electorial process"); Savin Business Machines Corp. v.
Rapifax Corp., 375 A.2d 469, 472 (Del. Ch. 1977) ("[W]hile the right of a shareholder to compel an
annual meeting under § 211 may be virtually absolute, he has no similar'fight to insist that it be held
at any particular time.").
53. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (1991); CAL. CORP. CODE § 603(a) (West 1990).
54. Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for
Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 537 n.9, 580 n.192 (1990). See generally Leo Herzel et
al., Consents to Trouble, 42 Bus. LAW. 135, 136 (1986).
55. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 156B, § 43 (West 1992).
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the likelihood that cycling would occur in this context. These dynamic
considerations would not always prevent cycling. Changes in external
circumstances, e.g., changes in relevant economies or changes in the
mix of shareholders arising from other causes, in addition to the cir-
cumstances described above, might result in successive votes produc-
ing conflicting results. The relevant point is that consideration of
dynamic effects can add an important perspective to typical static eco-
nomic analyses.
D. Alternative Rationales for the Rule
Other considerations may identify the benefits of the absolute dele-
gation rule. As noted above, a rationale commonly attributed to the
rule is that it is not efficient for a corporation with many shareholders
to engage in shareholder decision-making, and this rule reflects that
understanding. Moreover, proper presentation of these decisions to
shareholders in many cases would require disclosure to the public of
confidential information (to the corporation's disadvantage).56 Profes-
sor Gordon has argued that this rationale only supports making the
absolute delegation rule a default provision of corporate law and does
not support its status as a mandatory provision. This argument is
not entirely persuasive. If the rule were a default that could be
changed by shareholder action, shareholders desiring to vote on a
particular matter would merely be required first to have the share-
holders approve permitting shareholders to vote on such matters.
Modification of the rule with the consent of both the board and the
shareholders is the law in some jurisdictions today.59
In addition to this practical consideration, permitting shareholders to
vote on various business decisions is likely to decrease the value of a
corporation's shares. Part of the value of a board of directors derives
56. E.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 514-15 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating
that reporting companies may fail to disclose assumptions underlying disclosed projections for com-
petitive reasons).
57. Gordon, supra note 4, at 354.
58. It is quite possible that a proposal to opt out of such a default would be likely to receive
shareholder approval, even if no particular proposal would receive the support of a majority of share-
holders, because the proposal to opt out of the default might receive support from a number of share-
holder groups that wished to have the corporation adopt proposals relating to various issues. It is also
possible that a vote on permitting action by shareholder vote would receive less support than a partic-
ular proposal, as some shareholders preferring adoption of a particular proposal might vote against
permitting action by shareholder vote in order to prevent adoption of another shareholder proposal.
59. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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from the coherence of its approach to corporate decision-making. Even
though shareholders may not have complete information concerning
all decisions that a board may make, present reporting requirements
and voluntary disclosure give shareholders some sense of the type of
projects that a corporation will undertake and the basis on which these
decisions will be made. One of the factors to be considered in pur-
chasing a security is whether the issuer will make decisions in the
future that the prospective investor believes will increase the value of
the security and the return on the security. However, permitting share-
holders of publicly held corporations to vote on a wide array of busi-
ness decisions does not permit a prospective purchaser of shares to
analyze this factor, as shareholders' views, and their competence to
make such decisions, are not subject to ongoing disclosure and will
change continually as securities are traded in the market.' That in-
creased risk would decrease the value of a corporation's stock, even if
one assumes that only systematic risk affects stock prices. This risk
could not be eliminated through diversification for a number of rea-
sons. First, there might be some bias in the selection of corporations
in which activist shareholders would invest. Second, diversification
will not eliminate the effect of voting by shareholders if, on average,
management would make choices superior to those made by share-
holders. Since management is in the business of making such choices,
has greater familiarity with the relevant information and benefits from
having confidential, non-public information, one would expect them to
be superior at that task (absent any moral hazard). Third, the notion
that shareholders may propose actions reflecting a social agenda pre-
sumes that economic gains would be sacrificed in the pursuit of other
goals.6"
As noted above, some jurisdictions permit close corporations to
grant their shareholders the ability to vote on ordinary business mat-
ters. The low turnover in the shareholders of such corporations, to-
gether with the small number of shareholders in those corporations,
60. Professor Gordon notes the difficulty that shareholders will have in assessing the views of
their fellow shareholders, but uses this fact to conclude that shareholders would collude and adopt
proposals not benefiting all shareholders. Gordon, supri note 4, at 378.
61. But see Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VANE. L. Rev. 1259,
1268-71 (1982) (arguing that implementing some social goals may not impose additional costs on
corporations); Palmiter, supra note 26, at 916-18, 923-25 (stating restrictions on the scope of matters
that may be the subject of shareholder proposals required to be included in proxy statements are
"paternalistic" and that there is nothing "pernicious" in permitting shareholders to consider alternative
goals and vote on matters reflecting those goals).
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increases the likelihood that shareholders would know the views of
their fellow shareholders. Thus, consideration of the absolute delega-
tion rule as reflecting the value of knowing the views of decision-
makers is consistent with a divergence in the powers of shareholders
arising from a corporation being a close corporation.
III. DISCLOSURE OF INTERMEDIATE ESTIMATES AND OPINIONS
Part II of this Article considered two dynamic economic insights:
that negative feedback will stabilize a system62 and that, for results
that are not complex, the time between changes in the environment
must be large relative to the time in which the participants will re-
spond. Game theory applied in literature analyzing legal rules may
present decision matrices or trees representing various alternatives.
Such an approach may be considered "digital": it divides a scenario
into discrete, successive steps. The analysis in Part II is similar to
analyses based on matrices, as only two steps require analysis, the two
votes, and our concern is only at those two discrete points in time,
because the interval is adequate to permit the system to reach a new
equilibrium. Part HI considers a context in which the application of a
discrete analysis is not helpful, because there are no separate steps and
the period of interest is the time during which successive equilibria
are reached: transient effects in the trading market for securities short-
ly after unanticipated opinions or estimates are released by reporting
companies.
62. Others have noted that one aspect of the present regulations of securities and futures markets
creates positive feedback in certain contexts. E.g., Ayres, supra note 1, at 981; see also Marcel
Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE LJ. 977, 985,
992-94 (1992) (stating that the crash of 1987 may have resulted from a liquidity crunch and noting
the possible exacerbation arising from purchases on margin). Market circuit breakers were implement-
ed to decrease volatility in the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the
Chicago Board of Trade, which restricted trading if prices fell by specified amounts. Ayres, supra
note 1, at 981; Hazen, supra note 6, at 170. Professor Ayres noted that as the market drops to a level
close to such a limit, individuals considering selling a security or future have an increased incentive
to execute the sale immediately (because they may be unable to execute the sale in the near future),
making a drop in the market price more likely, with such a drop creating an even greater incentive to
sell immediately.
Securities trading on a stock exchange also may be halted when the issuer is about to announce
a significant development. Those trading halts do not create a similar situation, as they are not an-
nounced in advance. See generally Charles M.C. Lee et al., Volume, Volatility, and New York Stock
Exchange Trading Halts, 49 1. RN. 183 (1994) (discussing the mechanics of trading halts and their
effect on the trading of the affected stock).
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A. The Scope of the Safe Harbor for Projections
A reporting company will be liable under Rule 10b-5"3 to individu-
als who trade in reliance on a materially misleading estimate or opin-
ion disseminated by the reporting company with reckless disregard of,
or with knowledge of, its falsity. Courts have held that a reporting
company is understood to be representing, by the release of an opin-
ion or estimate, that it has a reasonable basis for arriving at that opin-
ion or estimate. That representation will subject a reporting company
to an action under Rule 10b-5 if there is no such basis.' To encour-
age reporting companies to disseminate projections, the SEC adopted
the Safe Harbor. The Safe Harbor provides that a company will not
incur liability under the 1934 Act for issuing certain estimates, if the
estimates have been prepared in good faith and with a reasonable
basis.
The Safe Harbor does not apply to all estimates that would have an
impact on the expected earnings of the company; it is limited to "fi-
nancial items," statements of plans and objectives for future opera-
tions, statements of "future economic performance contained in
management's discussion and analysis of financial condition and re-
sults of operations included pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K"
and the underlying assumptions.' Although the meaning of these
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1994).
64. This holding has been applied to actions under Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C.S. §§'77k, 771(2) (Law. Co-op. 1991), and Rule 1Ob-5. E.g., Rubenstein v. Collins,
[1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,195, at 99,338 (5th Cir. May 5, 1994)
("[Piredictive statements are deemed to contain false statements of 'fact' under Rule lob-5 when the
predictions embodied in those statements do not have a reasonable basis."); Kowal v. MCI Communi-
cations Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d
1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[P]rojections and general .expressions of optimism may be actionable
under the federal securities laws:'), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943 (1990); Isquith v. Middle S. Utils.,
Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 203 (5th Cir.) ("Courts in the past have consistently recognized that a defendant
does not place itself beyond the reach of the securities laws merely by disclosing information that is
predictive in nature."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507
F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974) ("That a forecast, essentially a prediction, may be regarded as a 'fact'
within the meaning of [Rule lob-5] is settled." (citation omitted)). But see Raab v. General Physics
Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[P]rojections of future performance not worded as guaran-
tees are generally not actionable under the federal securities laws ...." (quoting Krim v. BancTexas
Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993))); Greenberg v. Howtek, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1181,
1185 (D.N.H. 1992) ("Statements about future events that are plainly expressions of opinion and not
guarantees are not actionable under the federal securities laws." (quoting Haft v. Eastland Fin. Corp.,
772 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D.R.I. 1991))).
65. In general, the Safe Harbor applies to (i) forward looking statements made in, or promptly
reaffirmed in, documents filed with the SEC and (ii) information in documents filed with the SEC
that relates to (x) the effects of changing prices on the business enterprise or (y) the value of proved
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terms is not free from doubt, and litigated cases have not clarified
their meaning, with a few suggesting that the Safe Harbor relates to
all opinions and estimates,' a review of the administrative history of
the rule indicates that the Safe Harbor is limited.
In 1978, the SEC proposed for comment a version of the Safe Har-
bor that would have applied to statements "containing a projection of
revenues, income (loss), earnings (loss) per share or other financial
items" and contrasted that proposal to one previously proposed by the
SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, which would
have applied to statements of "a management projection of future
company economic performance or a statement of management plans
and objectives for future company operations."'67 The SEC compared
oil and gas reserves. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b) (1994). A forward looking statement is defined as the
following:
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings (loss) per
share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other financial items;
(2) A statement of management's plans and objectives for future operations;
(3) A statement of future economic performance contained in management's discussion
and analysis of financial condition and results of operations included pursuant to Item 303
of Regulation S-K or Item 9 of Form 20-F; or
(4) Disclosed statements of the assumptions underlying or relating to any of the state-
ments described in paragraphs [(1), (2), or (3) above].
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(c) (citation omitted).
66. See generally Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1463, 1465-68 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying the
Safe Harbor to statements of belief that cash flow from operations, capital transactions and
borrowings would be adequate to meet cash requirements); Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d
1435, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993) (ambiguously addressing whether the Safe Harbor applies to an opinion
that a restructuring would return the issuer to a stable financial position); Roots Partnership v. Lands'
End, Inc., 965 F.2d 141 t, 1416-18 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying the Safe Harbor to a disclosed "goal"
for pre-tax income as a percentage of net sales); Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d
509, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1989) (characterizing estimated costs to complete nuclear power plants as esti-
mates of capital expenditures within the Safe Harbor); In re Abbott Laboratories Sec. Litig., 813 F.
Supp. 1315, 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("The most forward-looking statements made were 1) that '[certain
drugs] significantly strengthen [Abbott's] position in the worldwide anti-infective market,' and 2) that
'[w]ith [certain drugs], we are well-positioned to compete successfully in this marketplace during the
1990's.' These, however, are not the sort of statements on which investors may be reasonably expect-
ed to rely, nor are they sufficiently particular statements regarding financial projections, future opera-
tions, or forecasts of economic performance to warrant updating. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(c) (de-
scribing what constitutes a forward-looking statement)."); Rubin v. Long Island Lighting Co., 576 F.
Supp. 608, 613 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating with respect to disclosure concerning the tax treatment
of dividends, which depended on earnings and profits, "Plaintiff complains that a prediction was
made with respect to the [tax] treatment of dividends to be paid after 1980. While we find no basis
for this claim, the 'safe harbor' rule promulgated by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175, would be appli-
cable if anything the defendants stated could be construed as a prediction."). "The [Slafe
[H]arbor... has been implicated in only a small portion of cases involving forward-looking state-
ments." Concept Release, supra note 8, at 52,727 n.51.
67. Safe-Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 5993. 43 Fed. Reg. 53,251,
53,253 (1978).
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the scope of these two versions as follows:
The Advisory Committee recommended that the Commission encourage disclo-
sure of management's plans and objectives for future company operations,
planned capital expenditures and financing, and statements of dividend and
capital structure policies in addition to future economic performance. Guidelines
for disclosure of these and other categories of soft information are being consid-
ered generally, as well as in connection with possible amendments to [certain
reporting guides] to implement the Advisory Committee's other recommenda-
tions regarding soft information. Accordingly, the proposed rule only relates to
statements which include projections of: (1) revenues; (2) income (loss); (3)
earnings (loss) per share; or (4) other financial items.
The Advisory Committee proposal ... also relates to statement[s] of
management's plans and objectives for future company operations. When further
proposals relating to other categories of forward looking information are pub-
lished for comment, corresponding safe harbor rules will be considered.'
In adopting the Safe Harbor, the SEC stated:
The commentators also were unsure of whether the phrase "other financial
items" as used in the Commission's proposed rule was intended to cover the
items referred to by the Advisory Committee.
... Although specific guidelines relating to additional types of forward
looking information are still under consideration, the Commission has deter-
mined that the scope of the safe harbor rule can be expanded at this time to
cover those types of information that the commentators and the Advisory Com-
mittee urged should be within the protection of the rule. Accordingly, the rule
adopted today expands the items in the proposed rule to cover projections of
other financial items such as capital expenditures and financing, dividends, and
capital structure, statements of management plans and objectives for future
company operations, and future economic performance included in
management's discussion and analysis of the summary of earnings or quarterly
income statements. The rule has been revised to refer specifically to these other
items of forward looking information in light of the commentators' suggestions
that the broader coverage of the Advisory Committee rule be made explicit.'
Thus, the SEC expressed its understanding that the Safe Harbor
adopted the scope proposed by the Advisory Committee. The term
"future economic performance" was defined by the Advisory Com-
mittee as follows: "Management projections of future economic per-
formance ('projections') include forecasts of earnings, sales, net in-
come, and other financial statement items. For purposes of the present
discussion, it excludes statements of management plans and objectives,
budgets and other future oriented data."7 Therefore, although the
68. Id. at 53,252.
69. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections; Final Rule, Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg.
38,810, 38,812 (1979).
70. ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DIscLosuRE, 95TH CONo., IST SEs., Houss COMM. ON
1994]
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scope of the Safe Harbor is not clearly delineated, the administrative
history of the rule indicates that the terms "financial items" and "fu-
ture economic performance," as used in the Safe Harbor, mean finan-
cial statement items. This analysis is consistent with a recent concept
release issued by the SEC, which reaffirms that the Safe Harbor does
not cover all "soft" information.7' Examples of estimates or opinions
that may not be "financial items" or statements of "future economic
performance" include estimates or opinions concerning the perfor-
mance of a new product,72 asset valuations, 73 the outcome of litiga-
tion or certain qualitative informational items, such as workforce train-
ing and development, product and process quality and customer satis-
faction.74 Those estimates and opinions also are not similar to
planned capital expenditures or dividend policies and therefore would
not fall within one of the other categories of forward looking informa-
tion.
For any statement by a reporting company to be material, a require-
ment for the statement to be actionable,75 the statement must in some
way relate to the results of operations or financial position of the
company. 6 Most notions of how securities are to be valued are based
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 350-51 (Comm. Print 1977) (emphasis
added).
71. Concept Release, supra note 8, at 52,727.
72. Such an opinion was in issue in Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 814 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
The court did not discuss whether the Safe Harbor applied to the issuer's favorable characterization
of a drug; the case was decided on the basis of whether "information concerning the true risks of [the
drug] was improperly and wrongfully withheld." Id. at 1383. Cf. Westwood v. Cohen, 838 F. Supp.
126, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that an issuer's statements inaccurately minimizing the potential
impact of an investigation by the FDA may be actionable under Rule lOb-5).
73. Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections,
Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114,
1133 (1987). But see Rouse Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,508, at 78,632-33 (Apr. 13, 1983) (stating that presentation of balance sheets and
statements of shareholders' equity on the basis of estimates of assets' current values is within the
scope of the Safe Harbor as information relating to the effects of changing prices on the company).
Rouse Co. does not support the proposition that the Safe Harbor applies to all estimates, as the Staff
of the SEC declined to base its view on the alternative basis, suggested by Rouse Company, that the
estimates of asset values were projections of financial items. Id.
74. See Concept Release, supra note 8, at 52,726-27 (discussing this type of disclosure and stat-
ing, "To the extent that this type of 'soft' information does not fall within the current safe harbor
definition of 'forward-looking statements,' however, it would not receive the protection of Rule 175
or 3b-6.").
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1994). See, e.g., Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435,
1446 n.10 (5th Cir. 1993).
76. This reference to financial position and results of operations is not used here to mean the
financial position of a company as measured by generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP")
[Vol. 7:97
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on an analysis of the issuer's financial results. If the truth or falsity of
any such statement would not affect these items, a securityholder
generally cannot argue that the statement is material.7 It is therefore
curious that the Safe Harbor does not relate to some estimates and
opinions."8
as applied by a particular company. GAAP merely indicates how these items are required to be pre-
sented by a particular company. As used here, these terms refer to how a company generally is faring
financially. Determining the materiality of financial information is not merely a question of deciding
whether financial statements have been prepared in accordance with GAAP. Compare Monroe v.
Hughes, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,331, at 90,228 (9th Cir. July 24, 1994)
("[C]ompliance with GAAP and GAAS do not immunize an accountant who consciously chooses not
-to disclose on a registration statement a known material fact.") and Adams v. Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 432 (6th Cir.) (stating with respect to the liability of accountants for finan-
cial statements that were not tested in compliance with generally accepted auditing standards, "The
question of materiality in this context is whether, given all the financial information, there was a
substantial risk that the actual value of assets or profits were significantly less than [the accountants]
stated them to be."), cert. denied sub nom. Adams v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 449 U.S. 1067
(1980) and Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 832 F. Supp. 909, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that an
improper characterization of a litigation settlement as extraordinary would not be material) with
Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1992) (leaving unresolved whether the failure
to disclose a contingent loss not required by GAAP to be disclosed in the notes to the financial state-
ments could be actionable under Rule 10b-5). See generally Lance Levine, Note, Compliance with
GAAP and GAAS: Its Proper Use as an Accountant's Defense in a Rule 10b-5 Suit, 1993 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 109.
That management's concentration on the impact of any investment on earnings determined in
accordance with GAAP may skew investment decisions is discussed in Hu, supra note 2, at 302-06.
77. Part III.B. of this Article argues that prices of securities reflect not only financial results of
companies but also fads (or a herd mentality). This argument is consistent with considering mate-
riality of an issuer's disclosure as being limited to information concerning the returns from owning a
security. These fads develop because investors believe that market price trends reflect an analysis of,
or predict, the return from owning a security.
It is conceivable that an issuer could make an actionable statement relating to the trading mar-
ket for its securities, not directly concerning the company's earnings. For example, prospectuses are
required to include a discussion of the plan of distribution. See Item 508, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.508 (1993). That section of a prospectus may include a statement to the effect that the issuer
has been advised by an underwriter that the underwriter intends to make a market in the security (but
is not obligated to do so). An issuer might incur liability for making such a statement if no market
developed for the security and the issuer knew (or had reason to know) that the underwriter had not
intended to make a market in the security.
78. Determining whether an estimate or opinion is such a statement may be more difficult in
practice than may be apparent. Although estimates of a particular line item with respect to a particu-
lar segment is presumably within the Safe Harbor, since the materiality of any statement derives from
its impact on a company's financial position or results of operations, a reporting company may at-
tempt to characterize any estimate or opinion as relating to a financial statement item. In a recent
concept release, in which the SEC solicited comments on eight alternatives to the present Safe Har-
bor, the SEC indicated that one of the revisions that the SEC is considering is revising the scope of
the covered estimates and opinions. Concept Release, supra note 8, at 52,729-31.
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B. Economic Models of the Securities Markets
Recent analyses of the nature of the market for securities indicate
that the price at which a security trades may reflect not only an as-
sessment of the expected financial results of the issuer but also certain
dynamic trading factors, referred to as "fads" or "noise trading."79 To
the extent these analyses are correct, application of system dynamics
suggests that the limitation of the Safe Harbor to certain estimates and
opinions may exacerbate the noise trading effect.
A brief review of the way the securities markets have been modeled
by economists is required to present the context of more recent eco-
nomic models. In a widely cited article published in 1970, Eugene
Fama summarized the then-current model of the capital markets called
the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis." The hypothesis consists
of three forms, which are concerned with "whether prices 'fully
reflect' particular subsets of available information."'" In the strong
form, the price of a security is assumed to reflect all information, in
that no one has higher expected trading profits from unique access to
some information." In the semi-strong form, the price of a security is
79. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992), contains a thoughtful and more detailed discussion of the
competing economic theories that are summarized in this Article, with extensive citations including
many of the economic articles cited in this Article.
After this Article was submitted for consideration for publication, a very interesting, detailed
and thoughtful law review article was published applying chaos theory in an analysis of the securities
markets, the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and other aspects of corporate and securities law.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 546, 571-607 (1994). Building on the
recent work of economists, that article applies a concept-that a system's changes in response to
differing inputs may not be proportional to the changes in the inputs-to discuss circuit breakers, the
mandatory nature of disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws and the scope of
directors' and officers' fiduciary duties. Id. at 571-73, 598-607. That article, and the other sources it
cites, are not discussed in greater detail herein, because (i) that article examines in detail aspects of
corporate and securities law not at the heart of this Article and (ii) the timing of that article's publi-
cation makes such a discussion impracticable. This Article does concur with Professor Cunningham's
suggestion "that legal scholars and policymakers focus more closely on recent developments in math-
ematics and physics that call into question even the weak form of the [Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis]," id. at 608, or that call into question other assumptions underlying legal doctrines, with
the slight refinement that older insights and those of the applied sciences should not be overlooked.
Of course, where a legal doctrine historically has been justified on the basis of an economic theory
that is shown to be inaccurate, the doctrine should not be abandoned unless the inaccurate assumption
is necessary to support the doctrine.
80. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383 (1970).
81. Id. at 388.
82. Id. at 409.
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assumed to reflect all "obviously" publicly available information.83 In
the weak form, "the information subset of interest is just past price (or
return) histories."'  The legal literature based on the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis has generally adopted the semi-strong version'
(the strong form not being consistent with insider trading being action-
able" and the weak form not being of significant use).
A refinement of this analysis noted that this hypothesis only ad-
dresses the extent to which relevant information is reflected in a
security's price, and drew a distinction between this hypothesis, re-
ferred to as "informational efficiency," and whether a security price
actually reflects an assessment of fundamental values, referred to as
"fundamental efficiency."" For example, if the securities market ful-
ly reflected all publicly available information and the market prices
equaled the discounted value of the expected payment stream to be
derived from owning a security but used arbitrarily different discount
factors to value different business segments, such a market would be
informationally efficient but not fundamentally efficient.
Certain facts have lead some economists more recently to question
whether the securities markets are efficient. Some of this evidence is
based on tests of the informational efficiency of the capital markets
consisting of determining whether there are any trading schemes that
outperform the market. Evidence suggesting that additional returns are
available in the month of January8 and that there are historically
greater returns from investing in securities selected by Value Line 9
seems to contradict the informational efficiency of the capital markets.
83. Id at 404.
84. Id. at 388.
85. E.g., Ayres, supra note 1, at 966 (stating that only the semi-strong version supports the fraud
on the market theory); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911 (1989) ("The central premise of the fraud on the
market theory is that prices of actively-traded securities reflect publicly-available information. This
premise is roughly equivalent to the semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.");
Langevoort, supra note 79, at 853 n.7; Daines & Hanson, supra note 1, at 611 n.160 ("The evidence,
however, suggests that market prices do not fully reflect nonpublic information.").
86. Langevoort, supra note 79, at 853 n.7. See also id. at 877 n.88.
87. E.g., Ayres, supra note 1, at 968-69; Fischel, supra note 85, at 913 (using the term "value
efficiency"); William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C.
DAvIs L. Rsv. 341, 344 (1986); Daines & Hanson, supra note 1, at 615.
88. See STEPHEN A. Ross Er AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 353 (2d ed. 1990); Kahan, supra note 62,
at 994; Langevoort, supra note 79, at 864 n.42; Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and
Martingales, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1583, 1609-10 (1989). See generally Fischel, supra note 85, at
913 n.12.
89. See, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 88, at 1609-10; Wang, supra note 87, at 349-52.
1994]
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The substantial market decline of October 1987 also seems inexpli-
cable if the securities markets are fundamentally efficient."
One proposed explanation is that the securities markets are in part
affected by investors who purchase and sell securities in "fads" or
follow a "herd instinct.""t These investors are assumed to be more
inclined to purchase a security if others are purchasing the security or
may make investment decisions based on the advice of financial "gu-
rus."' In securities markets affected by such fads, one would expect
to find securities prices to be oscillatory or mean-reverting, i.e., secu-
rities that perform relatively well in one period would perform rela-
tively poorly in the following period. Empirical evidence indicates that
securities prices exhibit this trait over periods of varying durations.
That investors trade in such patterns may also explain the continued
existence of "technical analysts," who recommend securities based on
historical trading patterns as opposed to an analysis of the earnings
90. E.g., Ayres, supra note 1, at 974-75 (stating, however, that the decline may support informa-
tional efficiency); Kahan, supra note 62, at 992; Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise
Trader Approach to Finance, J. ECON. PERsp., Spring 1990, at 19, 29. Contra Fischel, supra note 85,
at 916.
Although anecdotal evidence contradicting the informational efficiency of the capital markets
abounds, and may be of little significance, recent events may have provided an extraordinary exam-
ple. When news of a merger of Tele-Communications Inc., commonly called "TCI," with Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. was announced, the market price of shares of Transcontinental Realty Investors, whose
trading symbol is TCI, rose 15% in 15 minutes. A trading halt was subsequently imposed and a
warning was sent by the NYSE to its member firms. Anita Raghvan, In Rush to Buy Shares of
"TCI," Investors Trip over Stock Symbols, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at BI. Transcontinental's
shares ended the day down $.25. Id. One could plausibly construe the rapid return of the stock price
as supporting the informational efficiency of the markets, although that view would not explain the
original price change.
91. Hazen, supra note 6, at 145; Hu, supra note 2, at 357; Kahan, supra note 62, at 991, 996
("[S]tudies show that many people overreact to unexpected and dramatic news events .... Specula-
tive trading could also cause excess market volatility. For example, excessive declines in stock prices
could be caused by speculators that anticipate, and thereby fuel, panic sales by other investors.");
Bruce N. Lehmann, Fads, Martingales, and Market Efficiency, 105 QJ. ECON. 1, 2 (1990); Youguo
Liang & Donald J. Mullineaux, Overreaction and Reverse Anticipation: Two Related Puzzles?, 17 J.
FIN. RES. 31, 42 (1994) (finding significantly negative post-event cumulative abnormal returns fol-
lowing positive surprises); Shleifer & Summers, supra note 90, at 23, 28-30; Simmonds et al., supra
note 6, at 143; Wang, supra note 87, at 348. In 1936, Keynes characterized the securities markets as
reflecting "animal spirits." JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY 161 (1936), cited in Hazen, supra note 6, at 145. See generally Fischel, supra note 85,
at 913-15 (arguing that there is no better model for market prices than those based on the efficient
capital markets theory); LeRoy, supra note 88, at 1608-16. A detailed description of the literature
analyzing the theoretical basis of these fads is contained in Langevoort, supra note 79, at 857-72.
92. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 90, at 23-24.
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potential of companies.93 It is these trading patterns that can be use-
fully modeled with system dynamics concepts.
In the shortest term, if the market price for a security increases in
any particular trade, the next price change is more than twice as likely
to be a decrease than an increase, and conversely.94 Securities prices
show similar movements when periods on the order of one week are
reviewed. One study of equity securities listed on the NYSE or the
AMEX indicated that portfolios of securities that had a positive return
in one week typically had a negative return in the following week, and
vice versa.95 These results were found to yield a measured arbitrage
opportunity after deducting transaction costs.
-96
Empirical evidence also suggests that stock prices are mean revert-
ing over periods of a number of years. One study found that in port-
folios of securities traded on the NYSE, those that had performed the
worst over the immediately preceding five years had a greater annual
return than those that had performed the best over that five-year peri-
od.97 This correlation was found to be strongest among, and statisti-
cally significant for, firms with the smallest market capitalizations,
from which the authors inferred that individual investors, who are the
primary holders of stock of smaller firms, cause the overreaction ef-
fect.98
The information described above indicates that securities prices
manifest oscillations at various frequencies. Two additional aspects of
93. A description of these traders is included in Ross Er AL, supra note 88, at 342-43 and
Hazen, supra note 6, at 150-53.
94. Patell & Wolfson, supra note 14, at 226. The mean-reverting nature of stock prices, without
an indication of the frequency of the oscillations, was noted in Ayres, supra note 1, at 967.
95. Lehmann, supra note 91, at 25-26. Others have characterized the market for securities as
being excessively volatile, e.g., Ayres, supra note 1, at 970; Hazen, supra note 6, at 145, which is a
different way to describe the same phenomenon.
96. Lehmann, supra note 91, at 19-23.
97. Navin Chopra et al., Measuring Abnormal Performance: Do Stocks Overreact?, 31 J. FIN.
EcON. 235, 252, 255-57 (1992).
98. Id. at 255-57. Cf. Bagwell, Evidence and Implications, supra note 42, at 218, 221 (noting
preliminary findings that supply curves for stock experienced in Dutch auction repurchases are more
elastic when institutional holdings are high). However, the evidence from the study of securities
based on their prior five-year return indicates that securities prices exhibit momentum over periods of
one year-securities underperforming over a one-year period are more likely to underperform in the
following year, with a similar effect for securities that outperform the market. Chopra et al., supra
note 97, at 252. The authors suggest that this effect may account for the Value Line anomaly. Id. See
supra text accompanying note 89. Similar evidence of momentum in stock prices for up to one year,
with one-half of the excess dissipating over the following two years, is included in Narasimhan
Jegadeesh & Sheridan Titman, Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock
Market Efficiency, 48 J. FIN. 65, 68-69, 89 (1993).
1994]
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the trading market for securities must be considered: (i) the time peri-
od over which these oscillations to any particular event will dissipate
and (ii) the percentage by which the market for a security overreacts
to new information. Some information concerning the time period over
which securities prices reach a new equilibrium in response to new
information can be derived from reviewing the time period through
which trading rules provide statistically significant returns.
A trading rule consisting of buying and holding for thirty minutes
(and then selling) the stock of companies whose earnings an-
nouncements exceeded the most recent forecast contained in Value
Line, and selling the stock if the announced earnings were less than
that forecast, yielded statistically significant returns when commenced
at any time through the first thirty minutes of trading in the day fol-
lowing the date of the announcement."9 This evidence suggests that
unambiguous information is fully assimilated within one or two days.
Additional evidence supporting the hypothesis that the market re-
sponds quickly can be found by reviewing the prices at which stocks
trade immediately following an IPO. Empirical evidence indicates that
these stocks on average trade quickly at approximately 15% of the
public offering price."0 The market completes its upward adjustment
within a few days of the public offering."0' Recent evidence suggests
that within one to three years, a strategy of holding securities acquired
at the initial public offering price actually underperforms the market
when compared to various adjusted NYSE or NASDAQ returns.2
99. Patell & Wolfson, supra note 14, at 231-36. The authors noted that others have found that
systematic trading profits may be realized for up to two to three months after certain types of an-
nouncements. Id. at 227-28.
100. Roger G. Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 235
(1975) (11.4%); Robert E. Miller & Frank K. Reilly, An Examination of Mispricing, Returns, and
Uncertainty for Initial Public Offerings, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1987, at 33, 34, 38 (9.9%); Jay R.
Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3 (1991) (16.4%).
101. See Miller & Reilly, supra note 100, at 38.
102. Ritter, supra note 100, at 11. See also C. Sherman Cheung & Itzhak Krinsky, Information
Asymmetry and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings: Further Empirical Evidence, 21 J. BUS.
FIN. & Acr. 739, 746 (1994) ("underpricing appears to be a short-run phenomenon"); Tim
Loughran, NYSE vs NASDAQ Returns: Market Microstructure or the Poor Performance of Initial
Public Offerings, 33 J. FiN. ECON. 241, 250, 259 (1993) (finding that the average return for IPO's
over six calendar years in a specified period was 17%, compared to 76% for the NASDAQ index,
and noting that much of the underperformance is concentrated in periods following years with a high
volume of IPO's); William Power, In IPO's, if You're Not in on Day One, It's Usually Going to Be a
Losing Play, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1994, at Cl (citing a to be released study showing the
NASDAQ-adjusted return of stock bought at the IPO price peaked at 15% after one quarter and de-
creased to 3% after two years).
[Vol. 7:97
HeinOnline  -- 7 DePaul Bus. L.J. 126 1994-1995
1994] DYNAMIC ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
From this evidence, one can conclude that IPO's are not overpriced
and that the trading market for securities offered in an IPO is affected
by forces that dissipate over a period of time on the order of one or a
few years.0 3 It has been proposed that "fads" develop after an IPO
because potential investors base their decision to purchase on the
success of earlier sales efforts and disregard any private information
of the earlier purchasers (because that information is not available to
subsequent purchasers) and their own internally generated private
information."° It should be noted, however, that the existence of
such fads remains controversial.0 5
103. These articles provide only indirect evidence of when securities sold in an IPO are no longer
overpriced, and does not provide longer-term returns, because the articles address their return (as
compared to stock prices). For example, one could rationally postulate that the decreased returns from
holding stock over the period commencing one day after the IPO and ending one to three years there-
after to be an oscillation that dissipates subsequently. This Article disregards that hypothesis, based
on the absence of any rationale that would support the existence of such a post-offering trend.
Although Professor Ritter's article analyzing the long-run performance of IPO's does not ad-
dress their short-run performance, it is interesting to note that some of the adjusted returns appear to
manifest a minor secondary oscillation in the returns experienced in the first few months following
the IPO, Ritter, supra note 100, at 11, which may not be statistically significant.
104. Ivo Welch, Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades, 47 J. FIN. 695, 696, 724 (1992).
105. See, e.g., Thomas J. Chemmanur, The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model
with Information Production, 48 J. FIN. 285-87, 300 (1993) (collecting various reasons attributed to
the IPO pricing puzzle, and arguing that there is underpricing caused by "insiders inducing informa-
tion production in order to obtain a more precise valuation of their firm in the secondary market").
Postulated theories have included the following non-exhaustive list: (i) that the market for stocks sold
in an IPO includes two classes of prospective purchasers, informed and uninformed, and that IPO's
are underpriced because otherwise uninformed purchasers would realize that they would buy in a
disproportionately large percentage of those IPO's that were poor investments; Cheung & Krinsky,
supra note 102, at 739; (ii) that underpricing is a signal of quality and will be recouped, at least in
part, in subsequent sales; Narasimhan Jegadeesh et al., An Empirical Investigation of IPO Returns
and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 153, 174 (1993) (finding, contrary to this postu-
lated rationale, that "the return on the date of the IPO does not play a unique role in predicting future
seasoned equity offerings"); Jon A. Garfinkel, IPO Underpricing, Insider Selling and Subsequent
Equity Offerings: Is Underpricing a Signal of Quality?, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1993, at 74, 82 (reveal-
ing results inconsistent with this theory); (iii) that underpricing arises from the market giving the
issuer a superior assessment of the issuer's value; Cheung & Krinsky, supra note 102, at 745-46
(finding that the amount of underpricing is not decreased when the issuer is an investment bank,
which is inconsistent with the hypothesis); Garfinkel, supra, at 75, 82 (finding evidence inconsistent
with that proposition); Jegadeesh et al., supra, at 156; and (iv) that underpricing is an attempt to
insure against liability for improper disclosure under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 1934 Act;
Philip D. Drake & Michael R. Vetsuypens, IPO Underpricing and Insurance Against Legal Liability,
FIN. MGMT., Spring 1993, at 64, 72 (concluding that underpricing "has little effect on the issuer's
potential damage payments"). These theories are not discussed in detail, because they are inconsistent
with the increase in the post-offering price of stock being a temporary phenomenon.
Recently, it has been argued that stabilizing accounts for the rise in the average price of stock
sold in an IPO. Judith S. Ruud, Underwriter Price Support and the IPO Underpricing Puzzle, 34 J.
FIN. ECON. 135 (1993). The term "stabilizing" refers to the underwriters' practice of placing a bid for
(or purchasing) securities that are the subject of a distribution at, or just below, the offering price,
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The asymmetry in the response of prices of stock following an IPO
also suggests that there are separate mechanisms that cause the initial
price rise and the subsequent returns. This increase in price following
an offering also has been attributed, in part, to evidence that individu-
als who purchase stock in an IPO are more likely to make the pur-
chase based on an assessment of the company's product description or
strategic plan, and not based on a "theory about fundamentals such as
profits or dividends."" 6
C. The Dynamic Model
Because the Safe Harbor protects only estimates of financial items
(and underlying assumptions) but not intermediate estimates or opin-
ions, the rule discourages the frequent release of estimates or opinions,
each having a small incremental effect on the expected return on a
security. Rather, the rule encourages dissemination of fewer opinions,
each having a relatively larger impact on the market price of the af-
fected security.
The economic information summarized above has identified a num-
ber of separate dynamic responses that are observed in stock prices.
Creating a model incorporating all these effects would be too complex
and, in light of the continuing controversy concerning the causes of
these oscillations, would convey an unwarranted sense of certainty.
Instead, circumstances that may be similar to one of the effects, the
stock price fluctuations arising after an IPO, will be considered.
The factors identified above, suggested by some as contributing to
the overreaction after an IPO, are circumstances in which investment
decisions are made based on general assessments of products or stra-
tegic plans. A company that is developing a novel product or entering
which is designed to maintain an orderly market during the period when the offering is taking place.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-7(b)(3), 240.10b-7(j) (1994); Exchange Act Release No. 17,371, 45 Fed.
Reg. 83,707, 83,709 (1980); Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 336 (3d ed.
1989); Harry S. Gerla, Swimming Against the Deregulatory Tide: Maintaining Fixed Prices in Public
Offerings of Securities Through the NASD Antidiscounting Rules, 36 VAND. L. REv. 9, 30 n.113
(1983). However, "[practitioners] acknowledge.., that it would not be atypical to find that 10-20%
of IPOs are stabilized." Ruud, supra, at 140. In addition, "practicing underwriters claim that stabiliza-
tion seldom continues for more than two to four days ...." Id. at 139. See generally Kathleen W.
Hanley et al., Price Stabilization in the Market for New Issues, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 177 (1993) (examin-
ing the scope of stabilizing in new issues). Therefore, it is not plausible that stabilizing fully accounts
for an effect that takes one to three years to dissipate.
106. Robert J. Shiller, Speculative Prices and Popular Models, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 1990, at
55, 61.
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a new, unusual business line also presents these factors, and may
manifest a similar overreaction, if the new product or business is
expected to represent a substantial portion of the company's busi-
ness. t 7 In that context, the limitation in the Safe Harbor described
above discourages early dissemination of estimates that would facili-
tate analysis of the effect that the new product or business would have
on the corporation's future results of operations.
To create a simple quantitative model, it is assumed that the magni-
tude of any overreaction and its duration are similar to those mani-
fested in IPO's. In particular, it is assumed that the stock price of a
company entering a new business or developing a new product mani-
fests the following characteristics: (i) the stock price overreacts by
15% if the company delays disclosure of its new business or product
that significantly affects the market's valuation of the company's
prospects; (ii) the stock price responds quickly to the announcement,
reaching a peak one and one-half weeks after the announcement; and
(iii) 90% of the overreaction dissipates within one year of the an-
nouncement.
An example of a simple second-order system that manifests those
results is given by the following equation:
d2P 4.5dP + .2065P = 5.1625P [ dV+.o4Vdt2  dt ft dt
where P(t) = the stock price at time t, minus the
pre-announcement price,
Pf = the equilibrium stock price after the
announcement, and
V(t) = the change in value of the stock at time t,
based on information publicly available at
time t, expressed as a fraction of Pf
The response of this system is pictured in Figure 1. Curve A shows
the response of the system if the value of the company is increased
107. Others have hypothesized that the speed with which information is reflected in market prices
may depend on the nature of the information. E.g., Ayres, supra note 1, at 976; Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 556-57 (1984).
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gradually by $5.00 over nine weeks, °8 in the manner shown in
Curve B, to approximate the effect of a company that releases inter-
mediate estimates and opinions over that period. Curve C shows the
response of the same system if the company delays its announcement
for nine weeks, at which time the company releases information that
changes the value of the stock by $5.00 in one day.' 9 Curve C
manifests the assumed response: an overreaction of 15% of $5.00, or
$.75, that dissipates in one year. The difference in the responses is
consistent with intuitive expectations. The overreaction is substantially
reduced if the information is gradually disseminated. This benefit is
separate from the obvious benefit of having changes in securities









The model depicted in Figure 1 is not intended to provide a numer-
ical estimate of the effect of a revision of the terms of the Safe Har-
bor. The model depicted in Figure 1 has been selected because it is a
simple system, i.e., one with few terms, that manifests the assumed
characteristics. It has not been developed by modeling individual
behavioral characteristics of market participants. The coefficients have
been selected solely to create a model that exhibits the postulated
108. For ease of computation, the value of V(t) is assumed to be in the form of 1-e-'. Curve A
shows the response where 1-e' = .95 at the end of nine weeks, i.e., the value has reached 95% of its
final value by the end of nine weeks.
109. V(t) is again assumed to be in the form of 1-e', where I-e" = .95 at the end of one day.
110. See generally Kahan, supra note 62, at 987-1005 (providing a taxonomy of mispricing).
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overreaction where the information is disseminated at one time in
whole, and to see how such a system reacts when inputs are more
gradual. The model is uncommon because the rapid initial response
dissipates over a relatively long period of time without secondary
oscillations. However, the responses depicted in Figure 1 are generally
representative of the response of well behaved systems that manifest
overreactions-the overreaction is decreased where new inputs are
applied more gradually.
Figure 1 might seem to suggest that the overreactions are insignifi-
cant in light of the benefit of disseminating information promptly, as
depicted in the area between Curves B and C over the first nine
weeks. Such a conclusion is not warranted. The overreaction depicted
is an estimate of the average overreaction; in many circumstances, the
overreaction will be significantly larger. In addition, the timing be-
tween sequential changes in information available to the participants
may create a synergistic overreaction.
This model assumes that the rate of change of the equilibrium value
of a stock price affects the time-response of the market price. One
possible objection to this aspect of this model is that it "assumes the
result," i.e., one could argue that of course overreactions will be in-
creased by more rapid changes in inputs if there is such a term. That
criticism is not well founded, because the same effect would occur in
a model that did not contain such a term. A term dependent .on the
derivative of the value of the stock with respect to time has been
included to increase the accuracy of the model. If such a term were
not included, the maximum overreaction that would be exhibited by a
second order model (with terms of the same signs) that did not oscil-
late would be less than 15%. Moreover, this model is not unique in
assuming the existence of such a factor. t
111. For example, one article in considering, and rejecting, the hypothesis of a bubble in
Germany's hyperinflation during the early 1920's, stated, "A bubble can arise when the actual market
price depends positively on its own expected rate of change, as normally occurs in asset markets."
Robert P. Flood & Peter M. Garber, Market Fundamentals Versus Price-Level Bubbles: The First
Tests, 88 J. POL. ECON. 745, 746-47, 761-62 (1980). That assumption is slightly different from the
one used in the model contained in this Article, as the model assumes that the derivative of a
security's value positively affects the market price, whereas Flood & Garber assume that the deriv-
ative of the price itself positively affects the price.
Alternative, more complex and dynamically unstable models in which the market overreacts
could be developed where slight changes in inputs produced radically different results. See supra note
79. For a variety of reasons, the simple model described above seems preferable to a more complex,
unstable model, absent compelling reasons to conclude that approximations from the simple model
are not adequate. An essential element of any attempt to apply quantitative analyses is the adoption
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The quantities involved may appear to be insignificant. However,
the large number of transactions whose prices are affected by these
overreactions suggests that the aggregate dollar amount involved is
substantial. Others have noted that after-market trading is a zero-sum
game.112 That fact might suggest that the increased overreactions to
new developments should not be of concern, particularly as investors
may appear to be able to eliminate any losses through diversifica-
tion." 3 However, there are two reasons why overreactions should be
of concern. First, there is a bias in the type of investor who will be
the winner in this context. Investors who are able to purchase securi-
ties quickly, before the overreaction peaks, are more likely to be insti-
tutional purchasers, and not individual investors.14 Individual inves-
tors also are more likely to purchase at the peak of the overreaction,
because the fad traders are more likely to be individual investors." 5
Second, the SEC has been charged with regulation of after-market
trading. Any exercise of that power should be rational. Since there are
no identifiable benefits to the public from increased volatility in secu-
rities prices, the disadvantages arising from increased risk that inevita-
bly will not be eliminated, as investors will not be completely diversi-
fied, indicate that increased volatility should not be disregarded.
Another commentator has stated that it is more important that stock
prices be accurate at the time offerings occur than during after-market
of sufficient simplifying assumptions to make the issue tractable without compromising accuracy
required by the context. Physical laws may produce discontinuous results or results that are highly
sensitive to minuscule changes in initial conditions. Yet, it is not at all clear that the responses of
individual stock prices in a market of individuals (and computer-based instructions operating under
the oversight of individuals) usually will be dominated by extreme sensitivity to initial conditions.
There are occasional times when the markets appear to manifest unstable behavior. See supra notes
90-91 and accompanying text. However, the model in this Article is designed to analyze individual
stocks in periods in which the markets are not undergoing substantial upheaval, i.e., typical market
conditions. In that context, the additional simplicity of the model in this Article seems warranted.
Yet, ongoing additional complexity from computer-based trading systems and derivative securities
may increase the frequency of these unstable periods. Hazen. supra note 6, at 171-73.
112. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 641; Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 613, 700-01, 704 (1988).
113. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 641.
114. Cf Hazen, supra note 6, at 206 ("[I]nvestors who do not have the capital to engage in com-
puterized trading and other types of risk arbitrage cannot compete fairly in a market driven by such
trading strategies."); Stout, supra note 112, at 700-01, 704 (noting that while the trading market is a
zero sum game, insider trading skews the gains to the insiders to the disadvantage of the general
public).
115. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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trading. 6 It clearly is important that securities be offered with full
disclosure. However, the efficiency of a market consisting of offerings
made with full disclosure in allocating capital is suspect if after-mar-
ket trades, which act as substitutes and whose prices are used to calcu-
late initial offering prices, do not benefit from complete disclo-
sure." 7 Even if an offering market can be efficient in allocating cap-
ital notwithstanding after-market fundamental inefficiency, the impor-
tance of full disclosure during public offerings is not inconsistent with
encouraging proper pricing at other times.
Others have implicitly acknowledged the value of decreased volatil-
ity. One commentator has stated that pursuit of efficiency in the secu-
rities markets is not necessarily desirable, because an inefficient mar-
ket may incorporate information more slowly and therefore be less
volatile. 18 This Article demonstrates that. volatility may be affected
by the relationship between the speed with which the market reacts to
information and the frequency with which new information that affects
the expected value of the security becomes publicly available. That is,
it can be important to match the speed with which new information is
disseminated to the speed with which market participants react.'l
Regulations that are based on such matching will be superior to rules
that cause the same decrease in volatility and are intentionally "ineffi-
cient," because "inefficient" regulations impose ongoing variations
between market prices and actual values.
This Article does not attempt to quantify the extent of the impact
that the limitation of the Safe Harbor to estimates of financial state-
ment items has on the trading market for particular securities. Adop-
tion of the Safe Harbor has not been successful in causing substantial
numbers of reporting companies to include projections of financial
statement items in their annual and quarterly filings with the SEC. 20
116. Kahan, supra note 62, at 1000.
117. Cf. id. at 1041. This Article does not purport to address whether such an offering market may
allocate capital efficiently.
118. That commentator stated, "[A] more inefficient market takes longer to digest new information,
resulting in slower price changes and less volatility. In this fashion, policies that allow inefficient
markets may even enhance investor confidence by reducing variance in stock returns." Stout, supra
note 112, at 674. It is not clear how the term "efficiency" is being used in that context.
119. But see Kahan, supra note 62, at 988 ("[A] requirement that companies disclose important
information immediately and in detail may speed up the degree to which stock prices reflect such
information, but not reduce the proclivity of investors to overvalue companies in trendy industries.');
id. at 990 ("Inaccuracies caused by non-public information can generally be reduced by inducing dis-
closure; inaccuracies caused by misassessment cannot be effectively eliminated in this manner.").
120. Loss & SELUGMAN, supra note 105, at 635.
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This failure may in part be caused by the incorporation of these filings
into registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933
Act).' 2' Under the 1933 Act, issuers may be subject to liability with
respect to statements for which they would not incur liability under
the 1934 Act. Projections within the scope of the Safe Harbor pre-
pared without a reasonable basis but not prepared recklessly will be
actionable under the 1933 Act if included in a registration statement
but will not be actionable under the 1934 Act. 2 2 Therefore, compa-
nies that file registration statements on Form S-2 or S-3 that believe
that they have not prepared certain opinions recklessly, but are unwill-
ing to risk incurring the cost of defending against, and possible liabili-
ty for, a claim of negligence, will decide not to include those opinions
in periodic reports.
Reporting companies also may not include projections in documents
filed with the SEC to avoid an obligation to update, the projec-
tions. 23 A reluctance to update projections may arise for proper rea-
sons. For example, updated projections might require a premature
release of confidential information. Thus, removing the financial infor-
mation limitation probably would not, by itself, result in a large in-
crease in the number of projections filed with the SEC. The increased
volatility that this Article demonstrates arises from less frequent dis-
closure of material information concerning reporting companies sug-
gests that those other provisions of the Safe Harbor that discourage
disclosure of projections be reexamined. Perhaps removal of the finan-
cial information limitation would encourage dissemination of opinions
that are inordinately likely to mislead investors. This Article suggests
only that the volatility of stock prices should be considered in evaluat-
ing the benefits of the terms of the Safe Harbor.
The evidence described above indicates that the securities markets
exhibit oscillatory movements over varying periods of time. 24 It is
121. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77a-77aa (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1993). See, e.g., Rouse Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,508, at 78,631 (Apr. 13,
1983). Cf. Concept Release, supra note 8, at 52,730 (describing a proposal under which certain for-
ward looking statements in 1934 Act filings would not be incorporated in 1933"Act registration state-
ments).
122. See Safe Harbor Rule for Projections; Final Rule, Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed.
Reg. 38,810, 38,811 n.9 (1979).
123. See Concept Release, supra note 8, at 52,729; Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 Fed. Reg.
38,810, 38,813; 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii) (1993):
124. Of course, if these oscillations were predictable, market forces would eliminate the oscilla-
tions through purchases in advance of a rise and sales before the fall. Cf. Ross Er AL., supra note 88,
at 342.
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not inconsistent for a system to exhibit oscillatory movements over
different time periods; t 5 such a response may indicate the existence
of separate effects, each accounting for oscillation at one of the ob-
served frequencies.1 16 Economists are not unanimous in attributing
the observed oscillations to fad traders.2 7 For example, that any
price change is twice as likely to be followed by a reversal than by a
change in the same direction has been attributed to another aspect of
the securities markets. One economist has argued that a majority of
the price changes of stocks that are traded through market makers who
quote bid and asked prices will be price reversals. The underlying
concept is that if there were no change in the value of the stock, all
successive price changes would necessarily be reversals, as trades are
made at either the bid or asked price. 2 With respect to the long-
term oscillations, others have hypothesized that these oscillations are
caused by varying risks or sizes of the relevant firms.129 The import
of these disagreements among' economists, for the purposes of this
Article, is that perhaps some part of the observed oscillations in se-
curities prices results from causes that are not within the scope of the
discussion set forth above.
D. The Filing Requirement of the Safe Harbor
Applicability of the Safe Harbor also is conditioned on the estimate
or opinion either (i) being first disclosed in a document filed with the
SEC or (ii) being promptly reaffirmed in a document so filed. 3 Be-
fore the SEC first proposed the Safe Harbor in the early 1970's, the
SEC had prohibited the inclusion of earnings estimates in documents
required to be filed under the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act."' The SEC
became concerned that these estimates were being selectively released
by reporting companies and that investors without preferred access to
125. See Fisher Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 532 n.9 (1986) (citing a model in which long-run
prices were efficient although short-run prices did not need to be efficient).
126. See Lehmann, supra note 91, at 2 (noting different dynamic aspects affecting short-term and
long-term responses).
127. See Chopra et al., supra note 97, at 236; Langevoort, supra note 79, at 864-65.
128. Richard Roll, A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Mar-
ket, 39 J. FiN. 1127, 1128 (1984).
129. Chopra et al., supra note 97, at 236; Langevoort, supra note 79, at 866 n.48.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b)(1) (1994).
131. Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362,
38 Fed. Reg. 7220 (1973).
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management were at a disadvantage.132 The SEC originally proposed
that reporting companies that release projections to any third party be
required to file the projections with the SEC, ensuring equal ac-
cess. 33 The SEC substantially revised its original proposal when it
adopted the Safe Harbor and eliminated the obligation to disclose all
projections made available to third parties, but the requirement that the
estimate be filed with the SEC if the Safe Harbor is to be applied
remains as a vestige of that initial concern.1 34
As noted above,135 empirical evidence indicates that the market
reacts to earnings announcements within a few trading days. To the
extent that the filing requirement is designed to assure that outsiders
(i.e., individual investors) are granted equal access to this information
through the SEC, the requirement is ineffective because market prices
will reflect new information released to analysts before it is required
to be filed. The effects of the filing requirement are particularly per-
verse where a statement that has not been so filed forms the basis of a
suit under Rule lOb-5 in which reliance is alleged through fraud on
the market. Elimination of this requirement would not prevent the
SEC's commencing an enforcement action for selective disclo-
sure. 1
36
IV. THE IPO PRICING MARKET
Some efforts in legal journals to explain average increases in the
prices at which stock trades immediately after an IPO have been
troublesome in that they impute complex economic analyses to indi-
viduals who may not acknowledge that they are motivated by those
132. Id.
133. Id. at 7221.
134. The present effect of this requirement is unclear, because courts have developed a separate
doctrine under which disclosure that "bespeaks caution" cannot form the basis for an action under the
federal securities laws. See, e.g., Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1993);
Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993); Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991);
Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986); Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doc-
trine: Revisiting the Application of Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Estimates, 19 J. CORP. L.
243 (1994); Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994).
Under this doctrine, reporting companies may avoid liability on a basis similar to that provided by
the Safe Harbor.
135. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., SEC v. Stevens, SEC Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 SEC Docket (CCH) 735
(Mar. 19, 1991) (announcing the settlement of claims alleging selective disclosure by a company's
CEO of negative, nonpublic information to a few analysts).
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imputed rationales.1 37 Those articles did not benefit from evidence
indicating that the post-offering increase is temporary. Analysis of the
legal framework regulating initial public offerings may explain why
dynamic overreactions are exacerbated following an IPO.138  Stock
sold in IPO's typically is distributed to the public in a firm-commit-
ment, fixed-price offering.'39 In such an offering, the underwriters
are required to sell the stock to the public during the distribution at a
price fixed in the prospectus. The underwriters also are required to
buy all the offered stock if all the conditions in the underwriting
agreement are satisfied, 140  even if the aggregate demand for the
stock at the public offering price is less than the number of shares
offered.
These conditions create an incentive for underwriters to agree to
sell underwritten securities as quickly as possible, because there is a
substantial risk that intervening events will adversely affect the value
of the securities. 4' To sell securities more quickly, underwriters will
naturally tend to place the securities with investors willing to purchase
large amounts of the securities. As a result, the group of purchasers to
whom underwriters will sell the securities may include a proportion-
ately greater amount of institutional purchasers than is reflected in the
securities markets as a whole. However, individuals can purchase in
the aftermarket, and those sales generally will initially be at a higher
price than the initial public offering price (because the initial purchas-
ers will iot be willing to sell at an immediate loss and the underwrit-
ers may be stabilizing 42). The aggregate demand for the security
137. E.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 107, at 622 n.197 ("We argue that passing on to the
customer a portion of the return the underwriter receives for pledging its reputation is best understood
as a capital investment in reputation, a way of ensuring that the customer's ex post experience will be
consistent with the issuer's and the investment banker's ex ante representations."); Levmore, supra
note 42, at 657-63. Cf. RASMUSEN, supra note 15, at 218-19 (arguing that issuers underprice to signal
that the variance of the share value is high, which is important to the undiversified original share-
holder(s) but not to the market and suggests that the market price should be higher than the value
assigned by the selling shareholders).
138. The possibility that the nature of a fixed-price offering may play a part in post-offering price
increases was identified in Ibbotson, supra note 100, at 262-64. However, it is not clear what conclu-
sions that article draws concerning the causes of the price increase.
139. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 105, at 324.
140. These conditions typically include that the offering documents are not false or misleading as
of the closing and that there has not been some extraordinary event that adversely affects the securi-
ties markets generally. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 105, at 328.
141. Regulatory difficulties that may arise if an underwriter takes a part of the offering into its
investment account in an overpriced offering are described in Daniel J. Winnike & Christopher E.
Nordquist, Federal Securities Law Issues for the Sticky Offering, 48 Bus. LAW. 869 (1993).
142. See supra note 105 for a definition of stabilizing.
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will be greater immediately following the IPO, because those able to
purchase the security will include all investors. The post-offering
participation of the individual investors may magnify the "herd trad-
ing" effect, because investors who follow those trading patterns are
more likely to be purchasers.
As noted above,' 43 decisions to purchase stock in an IPO
frequently are not based on an analysis of fundamentals. Thus, the
increased price arising after the IPO has a diminished effect on the
desire of these investors to purchase the stock, as their decisions are
not based on some formal analysis of the earnings compared to the
cost of the stock. This analysis of the regulatory environment of IPO's
also is consistent with the hypothesis noted above1" that fads arise
when the later purchasers do not examine fundamentals, as this analy-
sis of the regulatory environment postulates that individual investors,
who will generally have less private information, are more likely to be
the subsequent purchasers.
Even though the regulatory scheme increases the likelihood that
there will be an initial increase in the price of a stock immediately
after an IPO, this fact does not necessarily mean that the SEC should
encourage alternative methods of stock distribution. Although there is
a bias against individual purchasers, perhaps revising the rule would
have a greater adverse impact. If offering prices were not fixed, per-
haps individual investors generally would be sold the securities at
prices higher than those charged to knowledgeable institutional inves-
tors. Such discounts were given to institutional investors before the
SEC approved the NASD's anti-discounting rules' 45 in 1980.46
Also, alternative distribution methods might create a chaotic market
that would be to the detriment of all investors. I47
Alternatively, one might attempt to decrease overreactions by facili-
tating inclusion of investors whose investment decisions are less af-
143. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
145. Exchange Act Release No. 17,371, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,707 (1980), approving amendments to
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, §§ 8, 24, and adding NASD Rule of Fair Practice, art. In, §
36.
146. Gerla, supra note 105, at 14-15. Since the overreactions existed before this change in the
NASD's rules, see supra note 100, the overreaction is not solely attributable to the restriction on
underwriters rebating a part of the underwriting spread to institutional investors. Rather, the point is
that firm commitment offerings, whether such rebates are permitted or not, create incentives to place
stock quickly, which increases the likelihood that fad traders will not be the initial purchasers.
147. See generally Exchange Act Release No. 17,371, 45 Fed. Reg. at 83,721-23 (1980).
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fected by a rigorous comparison of price/earnings ratios. Rule 430A
under the Securities Act 4' recently authorized registration state-
ments to be declared effective before determination of the pricing in-
formation. Since the registration statement must otherwise be com-
plete, one alternative would be to permit underwriters to agree to sell
up to a specified portion, e.g., twenty percent, of the offering to inves-
tors at a price to be determined in the near future, e.g., within one
week. 49 As long as a substantial majority of the shares were placed
with investors in the traditional fashion, those agreeing to purchase
shares shortly before the shares were priced could rely on the self-
interest of those who purchase after the price shall have been set to
result in a reasonable price. To limit the financial exposure of those
investors, the terms of those purchases might require that the price be
within the range required to be set forth in the preliminary prospec-
tus.
150
The thrust of this discussion is not to express an opinion on the
desirability of these regulatory revisions or to analyze them in detail.
Rather, the point is that areas for potential regulatory reform in dy-
namic environments may be identified by considering similar dynamic
effects.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In creating a model for any economic system, various assumptions
must be made. The allure of intellectually elegant theories, such as the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, may entice their application
without confirmation that the underlying assumptions are warranted in
the particular context in which the theories are applied.' 5 1
148. 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A (1993).
149. This time frame is consistent with subparagraph (a)(3) of Rule 430A, 17 C.F.R. §
230.430A(a)(3) (1993), which requires that previously omitted pricing information must be included
in a prospectus filed within five business days of the effective date of the registration statement (or a
post-effective amendment to the registration statement). A short period of time is desirable to mini-
mize the likelihood that there would be intervening material developments, which also underlies the
timing requirement of Rule 430A.
150. This range is required to be included in prospectuses for IPO's under 17 C.F.R. §
229.501(c)(6) (1993).
151. A similar concern was expressed by Professor Donald Langevoort:
People may not be rational investors, but they should be. The temptation to mold the
doctrine in the image of the ideal is strong, especially if the implications of reality are
more intellectually chaotic than we are comfortable to admit.
... Whatever the substantive or political motivations, statements regarding efficiency
19941
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For example, commentators also have argued that the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis supports requiring less disclosure of com-
panies that file registration statements of Form S-3.152 In fact, the
integrated disclosure system, with limited exceptions, does not impose
on larger issuers decreased disclosure obligations. Much information is
filed by those firms in periodic reports under the 1934 Act that are
available to all investors through the SEC, and the firms are merely
not required to deliver a copy to each purchaser.t 53 Regardless of
in the process of policy formulation are frequently stronger and less careful than they
should be. The danger is that a new wave of SEC and judicial policy making may
thoughtlessly reify this rhetoric, in areas such as the regulation of takeovers or the role of
shareholder monitoring.
Langevoort, supra note 79, at 912-14. A related sentiment was expressed in Daniel A. Farber, The
Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917 (1986):
In most fields of intellectual endeavor, the highest praise is reserved for brilliant in-
sights that overturn conventional thinking and common sense.... I will argue, however,
that "brilliance" should count heavily against an economic or legal theory. The same traits
of novelty, surprise, and unconventionality that are considered marks of distinction in
other fields should be considered suspect in economics and law, in which thoughtfulness
may be a more important virtue.
152. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 304 ("Larger firms disclose less than
others (Schedule S-3, for the largest firms, is quite streamlined in recognition of the fact that markets
generate great quantities of information about such firms).") (emphasis added); Stout, supra note 112,
at 638 ("Indeed, the belief that private market forces ensure that the stocks of large, publicly held
corporations are efficiently priced was one premise for the SEC's adoption of the 'integrated' disclo-
sure system which reduced the disclosure responsibilities of such firms. ") (emphasis added).
153. Some detail is required to demonstrate this proposition. Some disclosure requirements address
items representing a specified percentage of a financial statement item. Those provisions do not pro-
vide a lower disclosure threshold for large firms; they merely recognize that materiality depends on
the firm's size. In addition to that type of differing disclosure obligation, and those that are only
relevant to one or the other type of offering, e.g., the prior stock trading range, there are a few other
distinctions. Those provisions concerning a registrant's business that issuers filing a registration state-
ment on Form S-1 for a stock IPO are required to disclose (excluding executive compensation, quar-
terly items or information required for specific industries) that are not required to be included in a
registration statement on Form S-3 or the most recent annual report on Form 10-K are as follows: (i)
the development of the registrant's business for the four fiscal years preceding the most recent fiscal
year, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a) (1993), Form 10-K, Item 1, reprinted in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
31,103, at 22,067 (May 24, 1982); (ii) a plan of operation for the next two to four fiscal quarters
(including liquidity needs), which is required of certain firms, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(2) (1993); (iii)
the overhang of shares subject to resale under Rule 144 or issuance upon exercise of warrants or
options or on conversion of other securities, 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(a)(2), Form 10-K, Item 5, reprinted
in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 31,103, at 22,068 (May 24, 1982), although similar, but less detailed,
information may be included as a note to the financial statements; (iv) the identities of certain key
employees who are not executive officers, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(c), Form 10-K, Item 10, reprinted in
5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 31,103, at 22,069 (Dec. 31, 1992); (v) activities of promoters, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.401(g) (1993); (vi) any material dilution to the purchasers following the offering, 17 C.F.R. §
229.506 (1993); (vii) information concerning new underwriters, 17 C.F.R. § 229.508(b) (1993); and
(viii) whether underwriters will confirm sales to discretionary accounts, 17 C.F.R. § 229.5080)
(1993). Information referred to in (i) would be included in prior reports on Form 10-K for reporting
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the differences among the registration forms, all issuers ire required to
disclose any information required to make their offering documents
not false or misleading. In addition, larger firms that conduct business
in more than one segment have greater disclosure obligations, as they
are required separately to provide certain financial information attrib-
utable to each segment.154 There also are lesser disclosure require-
ments for small business issuers (which have revenues and a public
float of less than $25 million). 55 Thus, larger firms do not have ma-
terially reduced disclosure obligations, yet application of an elegant
theoretical model may suggest a conclusion inconsistent with the
structure of federal securities law. Similarly, conclusions derived from
static economic analyses of regulations affecting dynamic markets
may be misleading.
This Article has identified particular aspects of groups of market
participants that are well behaved, (i) that any feedback created by the
system has the effect of reinforcing an equilibrium and (ii) that chang-
es in the environment arise gradually relative to the time the system
needs to respond, and applied these criteria to refine economic analy-
ses of selected legal relationships created by corporate law. The prob-
companies. The information identified in (ii) and (iv) is information that generally would be material
information about the firm that would have to be disclosed even if the form did not specifically re-
quire its separate disclosure, and cannot be considered to be a substantial additional burden. The
information required by items (iii), (vi), (vii) and (viii) also do not impose a substantial additional
burden. Item (v) may require disclosure of information that the registrant would prefer to keep confi-
dential, and might require significant additional information. However, claims that large firms are
subjected to lesser disclosure obligations substantially overstate the effect of that provision.
Moreover, certain provisions expressly require greater disclosure of larger firms, and other
provisions, neutral on their face, create greater disclosure obligations for firms that have diverse
operations, which may generally require greater disclosure of larger firms. Those provisions require
disclosure of the following: (i) certain financial information (including revenue and profit) and dis-
cussion of financial results by business segment, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(b),(c) (1993), Form 10-K, Item
1, reprinted in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 31,103, at 22,067 (May 24, 1982), 17 C.F.R. §
229.303(a) (1993), Form 10-K, Item 7, reprinted in 5 .Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,103, at 22,068
(May 24, 1982); (ii) a description of the business for each class of similar products accounting for
15% or more of consolidated revenues if total revenues do not exceed $50 million, and 10% if total
revenues exceed $50 million, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(i) (1993); (iii) separate identification of profit
and assets by foreign geographic areas, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(d) (1993); and (iv) any restrictions on
the ability of subsidiaries to upstream dividends, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1993). Although the infor-
mation referred to in (i) may seem insignificant, its importance becomes evident by considering that
reporting the mandated information requires the registrant separately to account for profit by segment,
even though its accounting practices may not already identify items by these categories, and its prop-
erties may be engaged in use by multiple segments.
These provisions, in the aggregate, cannot be fairly characterized as providing for materially
lesser disclosure obligations for large firms.
154. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101(b), (c), 229.303(a) (1993).
155. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10-228.702 (1993).
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lems that result from applying static or digital theories to analyze cir-
cumstances where transient effects predominate, which have been
demonstrated by this Article, are not limited to the particular areas
described above. For example, a similar analysis might permit inter-
esting inferences concerning the effect that permitting insider trading
as a method of signaling changing stock values 15 6 would have on
stock volatility. In circumstances where transient responses are of
interest, dynamic economic analyses may prove helpful.
156. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 62, at 1003-05.
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